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ABSTRACT:
Suppressed Anger, Retaliation Doctrine, and Workplace Culture is an
interdisciplinary piece combining legal analysis with organizational
behavior/psychology research. Suppressed Anger examines and critiques
two employment law doctrines on retaliation—the “reasonable belief”
doctrine and, what we call, the “manner of the complaint” doctrine. We
argue that beyond hindering employees’ rights as has been examined in prior
scholarship, the law in this area also does a significant disservice to
employers by inhibiting emotion expression and thereby negatively affecting
workplace culture and productivity. The “reasonable belief” doctrine
essentially dictates that for retaliatory conduct to be unlawful, the
complaining party must have an objectively reasonable belief that the
practices he or she opposed were unlawful, basing the assessment of
reasonableness on whether a court would find the practices to be unlawful
discrimination. The “manner of the complaint” doctrine arises in cases in
which an employer deems the manner of the employee’s complaint regarding
discriminatory practices to be insubordinate and fires the employee on that
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basis. In these cases, courts rarely question an employer’s claim of
insubordination, ignoring the circumstances that gave rise to the complaint
and focusing solely on the employer’s subjective belief that the employee’s
demeanor was unacceptable. The result of both doctrines, we argue, is a
legal framework that incentivizes employees to stay quiet and refrain from
making any complaints.
This Article breaks new ground by drawing on existing scholarship in
the psychology and organizational behavior field detailing the negative
outcomes when employees suppress anger and other emotions in the
workplace, particularly in response to perceived injustice. We use this
research to argue that retaliation doctrine inhibits the useful airing of
problems that require management attention. Instead existing precedents
foment worker dissatisfaction and can lead to psychological and
physiological issues for individual employees that negatively impact the
workplace as a whole. As a result, we maintain that changing retaliation
doctrine should not be a goal of workers alone but that employers, upon
examining the research on expressions of anger in the workplace, should find
common ground with their employees.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2015, a former Google engineer tweeted the following
statement: “Rod Chavez is an engineering director at Google, he sexually
harassed me, Google did nothing about it. Reprimanded me instead of him.”1
Kelly Ellis explained the circumstances in a series of tweets throughout the
day, describing inappropriate comments by the engineering director and
others. Ultimately, she “reacted badly to something he said and ended up
pouring a drink over his head.”2 Rather than take her complaints of sexual
harassment seriously, Ellis alleged that Human Resources focused on the
“humiliation” suffered by the director as a result of being soaked by the
drink.3 In a stark description of the situation she faced, Ellis tweeted: “My
choices were: speak up loudly, lose my job, burn bridges . . . , leave
quietly . . ., or not say anything.”4 She had earlier tweeted the following: “I
wonder how many other women don’t report or discuss their harassment, for
their careers’ sake.”5
The choice Ellis eventually made, to leave on her own and then speak
up about the behavior online, is becoming a more common one in the tech
world.6 In February 2017, a former Uber engineer left her job at Uber and
then wrote a lengthy blog post alleging sexual harassment and other forms
of sex discrimination by her former employer and a massive failure on the
part of Human Resources to investigate or take any action in response.7 But

1. Mark Wilson, Google hit with sexual harassment complaint from ex-employee,
(Mar. 8, 2015), https://betanews.com/2015/03/08/google-sexual-harassment/
[https://perma.cc/D82A-LVVH].
2. Id.
3. Id. See also Rob Price, A former Google employee claims she was reprimanded for
speaking out about sexual harassment, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.bus
inessinsider.com/kelly-ellis-claims-she-was-sexually-harassed-at-google-2015-3
[https://perma.cc/X9P9-6MQZ ] (detailing the circumstances surrounding tweets sent out by
a former Google employee who left the company after her complaints of sexual harassment
were ignored and used against her).
4. Wilson, supra note 1.
5. Id. (quoting – Kelly Ellis (@justkelly_ok) Jan. 22, 2015).
6. Klint Finley, Tech Still Doesn’t Take Discrimination Seriously, WIRED (Feb. 20,
2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/tech-still-doesnt-take-discrimination-seriously/ [http
s: // perma.cc/8NS9-S58C].
7. Susan J. Fowler, Reflecting On One Very, Very Strange Year At Uber, SUSAN J.
FOWLER BLOG (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-onone-very-strange-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/QHR6-F48E]. See Sam Levin, Female
engineer sues Tesla, describing a culture of ‘pervasive harassment’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/28/tesla-female-engineer-lawsuitharassment-discrimination?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1 [https://perma.cc/9W9V-7LL6] (discu
ssing a current Tesla engineer who is suing company for sexual harassment and other sex
BETANEWS
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this choice is not limited to tech workplaces, to those alleging sexual
harassment, or to women. And it is not new. The risk that complaining about
discriminatory comments will end one’s career and leave little legal recourse
is a reality for many workers. The fear that management will retaliate against
the employee for his complaint or focus on his anger in response to the
discrimination rather than the discrimination itself incentivizes workers to
suppress those emotions and ignore the problem. But the problem rarely
ends with that worker. In fact, the overly narrow legal protections available
in such cases serve to incentivize workers to stay quiet (or leave and speak
up online later), thereby damaging the entire workplace culture.
Consider this scenario: James, a long-term employee, approaches his
Human Resources representative to complain about a horribly offensive
comment made by his supervisor in the workplace. The comment is racerelated and to James’s ears (and to many people), it is outright racist. James
is visibly distressed, cannot imagine working with the supervisor after this
incident, and wants action taken against the speaker. The Human Resources
representative agrees that the comment is unacceptable in the workplace,
promises some action, and follows up by approaching the supervisor to ask
about the incident. The supervisor, in turn, claims that James misheard or
misinterpreted the comment and that it is simply “not as bad” as James is
making it sound. But, he promises to follow up with James to “smooth things
over.” This meeting, as one might imagine, goes horribly wrong, ending in
even greater tension between the supervisor and employee. Three weeks
later, when upper management begins to put pressure on the supervisor to
cut costs, he takes the opportunity to terminate James who is not nearly as
effective as he had been in the past and who he now feels uncomfortable
supervising. The supervisor consults with Human Resources and feels
comfortable proceeding with the termination because he understands that it
is highly unlikely that any court will uphold a retaliation claim under these
circumstances.
After his termination, James returns to his desk to collect his personal
items before leaving the building. His co-workers see him packing up and
learn that he has been fired. Some of these co-workers knew of James’s
complaint to Human Resources or, at the very least, knew of his tense
discrimination and claiming retaliation for her complaints). Fowler’s blog post and other
sexual harassment and discrimination complaints ultimately led Uber to undertake a massive
internal investigation that resulted in the termination of twenty employees, the production of
a thirteen-page report of recommended changes to the company culture, and the resignation
of Uber’s CEO Travis Kalanick. Mike Isaac, Uber Fires 20 Amid Investigation Into
Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017); Uber Report: Eric Holder’s
Recommendations for Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017); Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis
Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017).
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conversation with the supervisor. Several employees make the assumption
that James was fired as a result of his complaint. Concluding that the incident
is over and no good can come from re-hashing it, neither management nor
Human Resources ever raises it again and neither takes any action against
the supervisor. The lower-level employees are left to talk among themselves
about this sequence of events. Six months later, the same supervisor makes
offensive comments about women. This time, despite being deeply upset,
not a single employee comes forward to complain to management or Human
Resources. Instead, employees talk to one another, becoming more upset as
they re-tell the story. Management notices increasing tension between the
supervisor and his employees but cannot get anyone to explain it. After
several months, the department’s output begins to drop, several key
employees quit, and management is left wondering what happened.
Why has this occurred? How did the existing legal doctrine on
workplace discrimination and retaliation contribute to this breakdown in
workplace health? And how could the law have helped to prevent it?
Now imagine if this scenario played out slightly differently. When
James initially complains about racially biased comments, he does not go to
his Human Resources representative but instead complains directly to the
manager who made the comments. The manager becomes defensive and
tells James he is “out of line” and that there is nothing to complain about.
This further inflames James, who grows increasingly agitated and begins to
speak loudly and more forcefully, necessitating a call to upper management.
When a more senior supervisor joins the conversation, James feels attacked
and continues speaking loudly and angrily. The senior supervisor views
James’s demeanor as unacceptable and terminates him on the spot. When
James later files suit, claiming discrimination and retaliation for his
complaint of discrimination, the employer responds that it did not terminate
James for making the complaint but rather for insubordination. It was his
tone and demeanor in making the complaint rather than the substance of it
that was the problem. The court accepts this explanation and dismisses the
retaliation claim on summary judgment.
Is the court’s conclusion reasonable? And how does the employer’s
response to this situation, as supported by the court, impact the rest of its
employees?
Deborah Brake, in her groundbreaking piece on retaliation, highlights
three aspects of the phenomenon that make it an important focus of scholarly
attention: (1) Retaliation is highly prevalent. Owing to “social dynamics
within institutions” and the negative perception of women and people of
color who complain about discrimination, retaliation is a likely response to
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such claims.8 (2) Retaliation is “powerful medicine, functioning to suppress
discrimination claims and preserve the social order.”9 The primary reason
that employees stay quiet instead of speaking up about experiences of
discrimination is the “[f]ear of retaliation.”10 And (3) an examination of “the
extent of protection from retaliation found in discrimination law tells us a
great deal about the scope of discrimination law and the values it protects.”11
This Article is particularly concerned with two aspects of retaliation
doctrine illustrated in the previous hypotheticals. The first is what we refer
to as the “Reasonable Belief” doctrine, explored in the Supreme Court’s
2001 decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden.12 The doctrine
essentially dictates that for retaliatory conduct to be unlawful, the
complaining party must have an objectively reasonable belief that the
practices he or she opposed (which, in turn, gave rise to the retaliation) were
unlawful and that the “reasonableness” of that belief will be based on
whether a court would find the practices to be unlawful discrimination.13 In
our first hypothetical scenario, under this doctrine, the employee
complaining about the offensive race-related comment would likely find his
complaint unprotected and his termination lawful because under existing
case law, one biased comment does not create an unlawful hostile work
environment,14 so it is not “objectively reasonable” to think that one
comment constitutes unlawful discrimination.15 As a result, a complaint
about the one comment does not constitute protected activity, making it
acceptable to terminate the employee as a result of his complaint. 16 Despite
numerous problems with this approach, the doctrine has been adopted by
every circuit in the country.17
The second doctrine is one we refer to as the “Manner of the Complaint”
doctrine and is illustrated in the second hypothetical. In considering whether
an employee’s “opposition conduct” is protected, courts often consider the
8. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 21.
12. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
13. Id. at 270-71; See Satterwhite v. City of Houston, 602 F. App’x 585, 588 (5th Cir.
2015) (holding that the employee-plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that his
supervisor’s comment created a hostile environment and that he could not have had
reasonably believed that his supervisor’s actions were protected by Title VII).
14. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.
15. Id. Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x at 588.
16. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.
17. Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s AntiRetaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007).
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manner in which the complaint was made and claim to weigh employer and
employee interests in reaching a conclusion about reasonable behavior.18 In
practice, courts rarely question an employer’s claim of insubordination,
ignoring the circumstances that gave rise to the complaint, and focusing
solely on the employer’s subjective belief that the employee’s demeanor was
unacceptable.19 Wanting to avoid a deep dive into the employer’s workplace
culture and judgment, courts generally blindly accept the claim of
insubordination, thus turning it into a “get out of liability free card.”
These doctrines, while problematic to say the least, are not new and
come as no surprise to the scholarly community. A number of scholars,
including Matthew Green, Craig Senn, Lawrence Rosenthal, Susan Carle,
and Terry Smith have criticized these doctrines as undermining the goals of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act20 and other anti-discrimination statutes21 and
the basic need to protect workers who come forward to challenge bias in the
workplace.22 While we agree with these scholars’ opposition to these
doctrines and the reasons they cite, this Article takes a different approach.
By drawing on extensive organizational behavior and psychology research
on anger in the workplace, and particularly on the dual threshold model
(DTM) of workplace anger, we present new arguments for a doctrinal
change.
We contend that in addition to undermining anti-discrimination
protections, these retaliation doctrines also negatively impact the overall
health of workplaces. Both doctrines have the effect of incentivizing
workers to suppress their anger and any expressive displays of anger in the
workplace. They thus inhibit the useful airing of problems that require
management attention, instead fomenting worker dissatisfaction and even

18. See Susan D. Carle, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title VII Cases,
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 208-09 (2016) (discussing court standards of reasonable
behavior).
19. Id. at 186, 200-09 (“[C]ourts routinely enter judgment in favor of employers where
the facts show that employees were mildly or moderately insubordinate in reaction to their
perceptions of discriminatory treatment.”).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (2000) (ADEA) (prohibiting age discrimination in employment); Americans with
Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (ADA) (prohibiting
disability discrimination in employment).
22. See generally Matthew W. Green Jr., What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness?
Rejecting a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 KAN.
L. REV. 759 (2014); Craig Robert Senn, Redefining Protected “Opposition” Activity in
Employment Retaliation Cases, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2035 (2016); Terry Smith, Everyday
Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REV. 529 (2003); Rosenthal, supra note 17; Carle, supra note 18.
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leading to psychological and physiological issues for individual employees
that negatively impact the workplace as a whole.23 As a result, we maintain
that changing retaliation doctrine should not be a goal of workers alone but
that employers, upon examining the research on expressions of anger in the
workplace should find common ground with their employees. Although
creation of healthy and productive workplaces is, by no means, a goal of
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, the pragmatic consequences
of court-created doctrines should not be ignored. In fact, consideration of
the actual impact of these doctrines on worker and workplace health should
spur support for change among employees and employers alike.
I.

PROBLEMATIC DOCTRINES

As illustrated in the introductory hypotheticals, this Article is concerned
with two court-created doctrines on retaliation—what we have called the
“Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine and the “Manner of the
Complaint” doctrine. These doctrines typically arise in the context of
disparate treatment or “intentional” discrimination cases wherein an
employee brings a claim of retaliation either in addition to a discrimination
claim or as a stand-alone claim.24 There is no shortage of such cases in the
federal courts. In fact, more retaliation claims are brought than any other
type of discrimination claim (race, sex, age, disability, etc.). In 2016, the
EEOC reported that retaliation charges under all of the federal antidiscrimination statutes came to 45.9% of all charges. Retaliation claims
under Title VII came to 36.2% of all charges, which is still considerably

23. We contend that these legal doctrines will continue to inhibit organizations’ wellmeaning attempts to change workplace culture until courts see fit to rethink their approaches
to retaliation claims. As long as company attorneys can continue advising management that
courts will reject both retaliation and discrimination claims, it will be impossible to create
meaningful change that would, ironically, benefit both employees and employers. Leora
Eisenstadt and Deanna Geddes, Anger in the workplace will grow without change in the law,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (June 22, 2017), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Anger-inthe-workplace-will-grow-without-change-11238151.php [https://perma.cc/PF8D-JPHF]; Le
ora Eisenstadt and Deanna Geddes, Risk of employer retaliation must be removed for workers
who claim discrimination, NEWSWORKS (June 23, 2017), http://www.newsworks.org
/index.php/local/essayworks/104984-op-ed-risk-of-employer-retaliation-must-be-removedfor-workers-who-claim-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6ZLF-ATRC].
24. See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination Litigation
Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M.L. REV. 333, 352 n.87 (citing John
Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 539, 541-42 (2007)) (supporting the proposition that plaintiffs often bring both a
discrimination claim and a retaliation claim in one action, but that a plaintiff “can recover on
a retaliation claim even when the court dismisses her underlying [discrimination] claim”).

EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:20 PM

2017] SUPPRESS’D ANGER, RETAL’N DOCT., & WORKPLACE CULTURE 155

more than any other category.25 Retaliation protections are made explicit in
all of the federal anti-discrimination statutes,26 and retaliation is often
thought of as itself a form of discrimination.27
At its core, Title VII provides protection against workplace
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. As
part of the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 703(a) of Title VII made
it unlawful for an employer with fifteen or more employees:
[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.28
25. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics (Charges filed
with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2016, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforc
ement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/Q5FX-XCFC]. There are likely multiple causes of these
high numbers of retaliation claims including (1) human nature that leads managers to react
poorly when confronted with claims of discrimination; (2) doctrine that makes it possible to
prove retaliation without explicit evidence of intentional action; (3) an expansion in recent
years of who is protected by retaliation protections and when such protections make be
invoked. See Thompson v. North American Stainless LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) (finding that
Title VII prohibits retaliation against third-party employees who are closely related to the
employee exercising his or her statutory rights); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (finding oral complaints to be protected under the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (providing retaliation protection to employees who respond to
questions during internal investigations); CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442
(2008) (applying retaliation protection to employees who complain about the employer’s
violation of another employee’s contract-related rights); Alan D. Berkowitz and Leora
Eisenstadt, The Ever-Expanding World of Retaliation: The Supreme Court Continues the
Trend, BNA Daily Labor Report (June 2011) (discussing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (broadening the definition of “adverse action” for
retaliation claims)).
26. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)-(b).
27. See Brake, supra note 8, at 21 (contending that “[r]ecognizing retaliation as a form
of discrimination, one that is implicitly banned by general proscriptions of discrimination,
pushes the boundaries of dominant understandings of discrimination in useful and productive
ways.”); see also Brief of Employment Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 5, Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No.
12-484) (contending “[a] long line of cases confirms that when Congress uses the word
“discriminate” that term encompasses retaliation.”).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(3).
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The statute also very clearly prohibits retaliation for complaining about
discrimination, opposing discriminatory conduct, and participating in an
investigation or proceeding under the statute:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.29
As a result, the statute makes retaliation protection available for two
types of conduct: “opposition conduct” and “participation conduct.”30
“Opposition conduct” includes internal complaints about discriminatory
conduct regardless of whether the complaint is written or verbal, formal or
informal, proactively made by an employee or in response to a question by
management.31 In contrast, “participation conduct” refers specifically to an
employee’s participation in an investigation by the EEOC, a proceeding in
court, or the employee’s own filing of charges or suit.32
Retaliation cases typically play out as follows: An employee believes
he or she was the victim of discrimination. The employee then complains to
a manager or immediately files a charge with the EEOC. A short time later,33
the employee is terminated, demoted or faces some other adverse action with
the employer providing non-discrimination, non-complaint related reasons
for it if a reason is discussed at all. The employee then sues, claiming
retaliation either alone or in addition to a claim of discrimination. In order

29. 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–3(a).
30. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S.Ct. 846, at
850 (2009) (citing that “[t]he Title VII anti-retaliation provision has two clauses, making it
‘an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’
The one is known as the ‘opposition clause,’ the other as the ‘participation clause.’”).
31. Id. See also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325 at
15 (finding that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a complaint, whether oral or written).
32. See Crawford, 129 S.Ct. 846 at 850 (describing the process by which an employee
may bring a statutory claim against an employer).
33. The Supreme Court noted that different courts have reached “different conclusions
regarding how close the timing between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action must be to establish the causal connection element of the [retaliation] prima facie case.”
See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Timing Isn’t Everything: Establishing a Title VII Retaliation Pr
ima Facie Case After University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 69 SMU
L. REV. 143, 152 (2016) (citing opinion in Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,
273 (2001)).
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to prevail on the retaliation claim, the employee, now plaintiff, must
demonstrate that he (1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity or
expression (e.g. a complaint of discrimination); (2) that he suffered an
adverse action by the employer (e.g. the termination); and (3) that there was
a causal link between the protected action or expression and the adverse
action (the short time between complaint and termination often provides this
causal link without any other evidence of causation).34 Upon demonstration
of these three factors, the plaintiff has met his prima facie case, and the
employer has an opportunity to present a legitimate non-retaliatory reason
for the termination. Finally, the employee has a chance to demonstrate that
the legitimate non-retaliatory reason is, in fact, pretext for retaliation.35 For
our purposes, we must begin by focusing on the first factor in the retaliation
prima facie case—the protected activity. Whether the activity or expression
is protected is the focus of the “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine
while the form in which the activity or expression emerges (and whether it
constitutes the true reason for the adverse action) is the focus of the “Manner
of the Complaint” doctrine.36
A. The “Objectively Reasonable Belief” Doctrine
The “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine is best explained by
consideration of the cases that created and applied the doctrine. By
necessity, we begin with the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County
School District v. Breeden,37 a case with bizarre facts that gave rise to an
even stranger conclusion. The case emerged out of a meeting between a
female employee of the school district, her male supervisor, and another
male colleague. The purpose of the meeting was to review psychological
evaluation reports of several job applicants.38 The report for one of the
applicants disclosed that the applicant had once made the following comment
to a co-worker: “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand

34. Id. See also EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that “to find a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII; 2)
plaintiff’s exercise of his civil rights was known by the defendant; 3) that, thereafter, the
defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and 4) that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”).
35. See Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x at 587 (explaining the recourse an employee has in
bringing a claim against a supervisor).
36. See infra Parts I.A and B.
37. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
38. Id. at 269.
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Canyon.”39 The plaintiff’s supervisor read the comment aloud at the meeting
and stated, “I don’t know what that means,” to which the other male
employee responded, “Well, I’ll tell you later.” Then both men chuckled.40
The plaintiff apparently found this interaction to be highly offensive and
complained to the offending employee, to the employee’s supervisor, and to
another management-level employee.41 The plaintiff claimed that she was
punished for making these complaints.42
To the casual observer, these facts probably suggest two things: that the
plaintiff in this case was perhaps overly sensitive to comments of a sexual
nature and that she did, in fact, make an earnest complaint about perceived
discriminatory behavior in the workplace. The Court, however, was not
sympathetic. In no more than three paragraphs, the Court dispensed with the
first factor of the prima facie case, concluding essentially that the plaintiff
did not demonstrate protected conduct. The Court began by noting that the
Ninth Circuit has applied Title VII’s retaliation provision “to protect
employee ‘opposition’ not just to practices that are actually ‘made . . .
unlawful’ by Title VII, but also to practices that the employee could
reasonably believe were unlawful.”43 The Court did not disagree and, in fact
took no position on this holding, concluding that it had “no occasion to rule
on the propriety of this interpretation, because even assuming it is correct,
no one could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated
Title VII.”44
How did the Court reach this conclusion? It did not rule that the
plaintiff in this case did not, in fact, believe there was a violation of Title VII
or that her complaint was in bad faith. Instead, the focus of the court’s
attention was on the objective reasonableness of that belief. To assess
reasonableness, the Court considered the underlying incident that led to the
complaint to determine whether it constituted unlawful discrimination under
Title VII. Because the incident involved comments of a sexual nature, the
Court examined whether these comments amounted to sexual harassment in
the form of a hostile work environment.45 Noting that “sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII only if it is ‘so severe or pervasive as to ‘alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment,’”46 the Court determined that the “isolated incident” involving
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 270-71.
Id. (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)).
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the sexual comments could not possibly constitute unlawful sexual
harassment.47 As a result, the Court concluded that “no reasonable person
could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title
VII’s standard.”48
The disconnect between the Ninth Circuit’s standard and the Court’s
approach is subtle, but essential. Whereas the Ninth Circuit was concerned
with an average employee’s “reasonable belief” regarding the legality of
workplace incidents, the Supreme Court in Breeden chose to judge that
“reasonable belief” by considering how a court would interpret the
underlying conduct. Because the standard for finding sexual harassment
requires a finding of “severe or pervasive” behavior, it concluded that no
reasonable person could believe that unlawful sexual harassment had
occurred unless it met this standard. The average employee, in the Supreme
Court’s estimation, is aware of the details of Supreme Court jurisprudence
on discrimination so that he or she knows how to differentiate between
offensive and inappropriate behavior and actionable discrimination. That
employee can then decide about whether to complain because she can
accurately pinpoint when Title VII has been violated and when it has not.
This is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “reasonable belief.” It was not
concerned with good faith or sincere belief, nor did it concede that an
employee untrained in the law might reasonably conflate offensive or biased
comments with actionable discrimination. The formula is strange but
simple: If a court would determine that the underlying conduct violates Title
VII, then an average employee may reasonably believe that it does. And the
reverse is also true: If a court would find that the conduct does not constitute
unlawful discrimination (whether because it is not severe or pervasive or for
any other reason), an employee who complains about that conduct did so
unreasonably and thus is unprotected by retaliation protections.
While the Supreme Court laid out this conclusion in several sentences,
refusing to elaborate on this novel interpretation, Breeden’s progeny — cases
in every circuit — have adopted this standard and provided more details on
its use.49 One of the more recent illustrative cases emerged from the Fifth
47. Id. at 271.
48. Id.
49. See Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1129. (stating that while Breeden firmly established
the “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine later elaborated on by lower courts, there were
already district courts relying on similar approaches before the Supreme Court decided the
case in 2001) See, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:96-CV-0196-CC,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16190, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 1996) (holding that “[t]he
reasonableness of plaintiff’s belief that a violation of Title VII had occurred is to be judged
based upon the legal authority existing at the time of the supposedly protected activity.”) See
also Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, Or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination”
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Circuit in 2015. In Satterwhite v. City of Houston,50 a city employee
complained to Human Resources about a supervisor using the phrase “Heil
Hitler” during a work meeting at which his Jewish co-worker was present.51
The supervisor was verbally reprimanded by a more senior manager. A short
time later, the offending supervisor became Satterwhite’s direct supervisor.
Around the same time, the Anti-Defamation League sent letters to the Office
of Inspector General (OIG) for the City that complained about the Hitler
comment and prompted the OIG to investigate. The OIG also found the
supervisor at fault. Over the next few months, the offending supervisor
disciplined the plaintiff several times and eventually demoted him two
grades. At that point, Satterwhite filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming
retaliation under Title VII and Texas law.
Mr. Satterwhite did not fare well at either the district or circuit court
levels. The district court rejected his claim because he failed to prove a
causal link between his protected activity and his demotion.52 At the Fifth
Circuit, however, the court, citing Breeden and prior Fifth Circuit precedent,
focused not on the causal link but rather on whether the opposition conduct
was protected under Title VII’s retaliation provision. And like in Breeden,
the court concluded that “While Satterwhite’s actions could qualify as
opposing under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), for his actions to be protected
activities, Satterwhite must also have had a reasonable belief that [the]
comment created a hostile work environment under Title VII.”53 This, the
court concluded, he could not demonstrate since isolated incidents generally
do not amount to unlawful conduct under Title VII. As a result, the plaintiff
“could not have reasonably believed that this incident was actionable under
Title VII, and therefore, it ‘cannot give rise to protected activity.’”54 The
Fifth Circuit simply and with little explanation utilized Breeden’s formula:
if the underlying conduct does not, according to a court, amount to unlawful
discrimination under Title VII, then the plaintiff, a non-lawyer city
employee, could not have reasonably believed that the conduct violated Title
VII and, as a result, his complaint was not protected against retaliation.55
And the State Of Title VII Protection, 47 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 87, 144) (arguing for a more
objective approach for assessing the merits of a discrimination claim).
50. 602 F. App’x 585 (2015).
51. Id. at 586-87.
52. Id. at 586.
53. Id. at 588.
54. Id. at 589.
55. In another surprising passage, the Fifth Circuit rejected Satterwhite’s argument that
the conduct was an unlawful employment practice because the OIG determined that it
“violated an executive order of the mayor of Houston prohibiting the use of racial, ethnic, and
gender slurs.” Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x at 589. The court responded that “the definition of
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Although the Fifth Circuit in Satterwhite gave this doctrine slightly
more consideration than Breeden, an even more extensive discussion of the
issue appears in two cases out of the Fourth Circuit, from 2006 and 2015
respectively. In Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corporation,56 the court
faced a set of facts similar to those in Breeden and Satterwhite. An employee
was present while a co-worker made offensive comments, complained about
those comments, and was ultimately terminated. In Jordan, the African
American plaintiff and his white co-worker were in the break room watching
television coverage of several highly publicized sniper shootings in the
Washington, D.C. area when the white employee stated: “They should put
those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the
apes f-k them.”57 The plaintiff complained to supervisors and upper level
managers.58 One month later, he was terminated for being “disruptive,”
because his position had “come to an end,” and because, he was told, IBM
employees and officials (with whom he worked) “don’t like you and you
don’t like them.”59
When the plaintiff claimed retaliation, his claim was rejected by both
the district and circuit courts because one racist comment does not create an
actionable hostile work environment and, as a result, the plaintiff did not
engage in protected activity when he complained about it.60 At the Fifth
Circuit, Jordan raised the argument that as a policy matter and in light of
Supreme Court precedent in Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth61 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,62 this conclusion placed employees in an
impossible “double bind.”63 On the one hand, prior precedent encourages
early reporting of harassment in order to prevent hostile environments from
arising64 and even requires such reporting in order to hold an employer liable

‘unlawful employment practice’ in Title VII is defined by Congress not state or local laws,
and . . . no reasonable person could find the ‘Heil Hitler’ incident alone satisfied Congress’s
definition.” Id. Even though the interpretation of hostile work environment upon which the
court relies is drawn from court precedent and that nowhere in Title VII does the statute define
hostile work environment or explain that a single incident cannot give rise to a claim of
unlawful sexual harassment, the court refers to the statute as if it provides a clear and obvious
definition of an unlawful employment practice such that all employees should understand its
meaning.
56. 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).
57. Id. at 336.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 337.
60. Id. at 337-38.
61. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
62. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
63. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341-42.
64. Id.

EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

162

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/27/2018 3:20 PM

[Vol. 20.1

for unlawful harassment.65 But, as the plaintiff noted, “[f]ew workers would
accept this early-reporting invitation [to report violations] if they knew they
could be fired for their efforts.”66 Nonetheless, the court rejected this
argument, maintaining first that the plain meaning of the statute provides
protection when “the employee responds to an actual unlawful employment
practice.”67 Second, the court noted that this language may be interpreted
“generously” to provide protection when an employee “responds to an
employment practice that the employee reasonably believes is unlawful.”68
Then, like the courts in Breeden and Satterwhite, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that based on the allegation of a single incident, “no objectively
reasonable person could have believed that the IBM office was, or was soon
going to be, infected by severe or pervasive racist, threatening, or humiliating
harassment.”69 In other words:
Although Jordan could reasonably have concluded that only a
racist would resort to such crudity even in times when emotions
run high, the mere fact that one’s coworker has revealed himself
to be racist is not enough to support an objectively reasonable
conclusion that the workplace has likewise become racist.70
Again, the court surmised that an average “reasonable” worker should
know the difference between offensive, troubling, and even racist comments
and behavior and an unlawful act.
In light of this strange conclusion by the majority, the dissent raised
concerns about some of the more troubling aspects of this holding. First, the
dissent pointed to the severity of the conduct in this case and its particularly
humiliating and degrading nature to African Americans.71 Perhaps even
more importantly, the dissent noted that in judging what is and is not an
unlawful discriminatory act, particularly with regards to hostile work
environment sexual harassment, the legal test “can be a bit of a moving
target; there is no ‘mathematically precise test.’”72 This point cannot be
understated—if courts might differ as to whether or not a hostile work
environment has been created, how can an employee without legal training
be expected to make the determination before complaining to management?

65. Id. at 342 (Plaintiffs are in a “double bind—risking firing by reporting harassing
conduct early, or waiting to report upon pain of having an otherwise valid claim dismissed.”).
66. Id. at 338.
67. Id.
68. Id. (italics in original).
69. Id. at 341.
70. Id. at 341 (italics in original).
71. Id. at 350-51.
72. Id. at 351.
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As the dissent ultimately concluded: “[I]t is not for unelected judges to
decide that Congress’s chosen remedy is unimportant, and that it may be
effectively eviscerated by some judicially created ‘reasonable belief’
requirement.”73
Given the intensity of the disagreement between the majority and
dissent in Jordan, it is perhaps not surprising that the Fourth Circuit chose to
revisit this issue again in 2015. In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp.,74
the dissenting judge in Jordan, now writing for the court en banc, reversed
the original panel’s affirmation of summary judgment for the employer in a
case with facts that are remarkably similar to those in Jordan.75 In BoyerLiberto, a cocktail waitress at a resort was called a “porch monkey” twice in
a twenty-four hour period, threatened with job loss by her white manager and
was fired soon after she reported the racial harassment to management.76 The
initial panel had concluded that in this case, like in Jordan, no employee
could have reasonably believed that a hostile work environment was
present.77 The en banc panel reversed, differing specifically on the existence
of a hostile work environment and concluding that despite it being an isolated
incident, the severity of the comments and the supervisor’s threats of
discharge made it an extremely serious incident that could rise to the level of
a hostile work environment.78
The Fourth Circuit’s change in this case is subtle. The court was clearly
uncomfortable with the initial ruling given the extreme nature of the
comments at issue. As a result, it essentially lowered the standard for finding
the potential for a hostile work environment and indicated that even an
isolated incident, if serious enough, could constitute an unlawful act giving
rise to an objectively reasonable belief and retaliation protection. The court
also commented on the difficulty of limiting retaliation protection when there
is bias in the workplace: “[A] lack of protection is no inconsequential matter,
for ‘fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of
voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.’”79 Nonetheless, the
actual difference between Jordan and Boyer-Liberto is quite slim. Despite
acknowledging the dangers of narrow retaliation protections, the court did
not change the “objectively reasonable belief” standard in any meaningful
73. Id. at 357.
74. 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015).
75. Id. at 268.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 275-76.
78. Id. at 285 (Awarding relief on the retaliation claims by “finding that [defendant’s]
conduct was severe enough to give [plaintiff] a reasonable belief that a hostile environment,
although not fully formed, was in progress.”).
79. Id. at 283.
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way. Instead of acknowledging that a lay person’s “reasonable belief” likely
differs dramatically from a court’s view, the Fourth Circuit maintained its
approach and merely adjusted its conclusion about when a court might find
a hostile work environment.80
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits are by no means alone in applying the
“reasonable belief” doctrine in such a narrow way. The Second Circuit,
considering a case involving allegations that a co-worker petted the
plaintiff’s cheeks with her hands and kissed her on the lips, in addition to an
overall working environment “characterized by lewd, racial, and sexual
comments and innuendos,” concluded that “‘[n]o reasonable person could
have believed that [a] single incident’ of sexually inappropriate behavior by
a co-worker could amount to sexual harassment” and thus deemed the
plaintiff’s complaint to be unprotected.81 The Second Circuit likewise
reached a similar conclusion in a case involving sex stereotyping rather than
harassment.82 Considering the plaintiff’s claim that she, as a female
secretary, received a certain type of assignment because of her sex, the court
relied again on the reasonable belief doctrine to reject her retaliation claim.83
Despite the fact that the jury found in her favor on the underlying
discrimination claim, the court concluded that without male comparators and
without additional evidence of gender discrimination, the plaintiff could not
have had a reasonable belief that the conduct she complained of was
unlawful.84 The Third Circuit, considering a case involving a single
allegation of sexual harassment concluded that the plaintiff’s efforts to report
sexual comments did not constitute protected activity.85 The Eleventh
Circuit reached the same conclusion but in a case in which the plaintiff, a
waitress at Waffle House, alleged that her manager made numerous

80. Even still, the dissent in Boyer-Liberto voiced serious concerns about a “sub voce
chipping away at the objectively reasonable belief standard.” Id. at 290. In particular the
dissent worried about an increase in unfounded retaliation claims, the trammeling of free
speech values if “all manner of perceived slights” becomes reportable, and the construction
of workplace barriers between the races and sexes. Id. at 291. The problem with the dissent’s
concerns, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part III, is that the psychology research
demonstrates that the opposite is true. The suppression of anger that results from a lack of
protection for employee complaints is what causes unhealthy workplaces not the reverse. See
infra Parts II and III.
81. Chenette v. Kenneth Cole Prods., 345 F. App’x 615, 617-19 (2nd Cir. 2009).
82. See Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Natl. Realty & Devpt. Corp., 136 F.3d 276 (2nd Cir. 1998)
(denying reversal of judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff did not show any reasonable
belief that employer actually relied on gender when assigning work).
83. Id. at 292.
84. Id.
85. See Theriault v. Dollar Gen., 336 F. App’x 172 (3rd 2009) (denying the plaintiff’s
claim on the basis of the reasonable belief standard).
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comments about the size of her breasts, called her “Dolly,” and pulled her
hair, and that an assistant manager admitted that he had been accused of
sexual harassment but that “nothing happened” as a result of the accusation.86
The Eleventh Circuit noted specifically that for opposition conduct to be
protected, “[a] plaintiff must demonstrate that she had a subjective, goodfaith belief that her employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices
and that her belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record
presented. The plaintiff’s subjective belief is measured against the
substantive law at the time of the offense.”87 The court seemed to admit that
the law on discriminatory practices is in flux but nonetheless expected the
plaintiff to be knowledgeable about the state of the law at the time of her
complaint. Finally, the Tenth Circuit, in a case involving racial comments
directed at a white woman who was married to a black man, concluded that
despite a jury verdict in her favor on the underlying discrimination claim,
“No reasonable person could have believed that the single . . . incident
violated Title VII’s standard.”88 These cases are a sampling of likeminded
rulings in all the circuits where the doctrine continues to be upheld and
applied in somewhat shocking ways.89
B. The “Manner of the Complaint” Doctrine
The second doctrine that this Article considers is the “manner of the
complaint” doctrine90 and focuses both on the first prong of the prima facie
case of retaliation and on the pretext consideration. In a “manner of the
complaint” case, the plaintiff typically complains in an angry or aggressive
manner about some experience of bias in the workplace. The employer
responds by punishing the employee through termination, demotion, or some
other means. When the employee sues claiming retaliation, the employer
responds that the “punishment” was in response to the way in which the
employee complained and not to the complaint itself. And courts, generally

86. Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 F. App’x 499, 502 (11th Cir. 2007).
Presumably, the name calling referred to Dolly Parton because of her famously large breasts.
See Frances Romero, Dolly Parton’s Breasts, TIME (Sept. 1, 2010), http://content.time.com
/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2015171_2015172_2015159,00.html
[https://perma.cc/VG6F-7CBD ] (describing Parton’s “two most famous assets”).
87. Henderson, 238 F. App’x. at 501 (internal citations omitted).
88. Robinson v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs. LLC, 365 F. App’x 104, 113 (10th Cir. 2010).
89. See Senn, supra note 22, at charts 1 & 2 (compiling “unprotected complaint” cases
in the circuit courts) (note that Lexis version of article contains no page numbers).
90. We have chosen to name this approach to insubordination cases the “manner of the
complaint” doctrine to highlight that employers and courts focus here on the form in which
the complaint is made rather than its substance.
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hesitant to question the business judgment of employers, typically side with
the employer without a serious consideration of the details of the employee’s
complaint, the context in which his or her outburst occurred, the culture of
the workplace and the behavior that the employer generally tolerates, or any
other factors.91 As with the “reasonable belief” doctrine, it is helpful to
examine the details of some of the cases that apply this “manner of the
complaint” doctrine, which spans multiple circuits and has been in use since
at least the 1980’s.
One of the clearest examples of this doctrine came out of the Seventh
Circuit and involved an employee at a sugar company.92 As a result of the
disappearance of some sugar, the company began random searches. The
plaintiff, an African American warehouse manager, was accused of stealing
sugar and subjected to searches, and the Director of Operations called him a
“black thief” despite the fact that the searches did not yield any evidence of
theft.93 The plaintiff filed a complaint with both the EEOC and the Indiana
Civil Rights Commission alleging race-based disparate treatment and
another charge with the EEOC alleging retaliation based on overtime
disbursals.94
Approximately two months after receiving his right to sue letter from
the EEOC, a series of events occurred that ultimately led to the plaintiff’s
termination.95 First, the director of operations sent a memo asking the
operations managers to list their five main performance goals. The plaintiff,
believing he was being singled out for this task, went to the director’s office
to complain and, per the employer’s testimony, “became very loud and
angry.”96 A few days later, despite the fact that the plaintiff complied with
the task, the director gave him “a written warning stating that any future
incidents of insolent or disrespectful behavior would not be tolerated and
would result in disciplinary action, including possible termination.”97 The
plaintiff responded with a written memorandum stating that “he did not
intend to appear hostile.”98 Thereafter, the president of the company met
with the plaintiff, intending to reprimand the plaintiff for his “insubordinate
conduct” during his meeting with the director.99 The conversation escalated
to an argument of sorts with the plaintiff allegedly interrupting the president
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See infra Part I.B.
McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
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and shouting.100 The president testified that he told the plaintiff he “was not
going to engage in a shouting match” and then terminated him for “grossly
insubordinate conduct during the meeting.”101
The Seventh Circuit quickly established that the plaintiff had met his
prima facie case of retaliation and focused on the pretext question. The court
concluded that the employer’s legitimate reason—insubordination—could
not be shown to be pretextual, dooming the plaintiff’s claim. In reaching this
conclusion, the court clarified the lens with which it evaluates claims of
insubordination:
Although there is some disagreement about the details of that
encounter, the record does not place in doubt ISI’s contention that
it made a good-faith estimation that Mr. McClendon had been
disrespectful. It is important to recall that it is not relevant
whether Mr. McClendon actually was insubordinate. All that is
relevant is whether his employer was justified in coming to that
conclusion. . . . The record before us raises no genuine issue of
triable fact as to whether Mr. McClendon’s superiors believed in
good faith that he was insubordinate.102
The essential question, as posed by the court, is whether the employer
demonstrates that it acted in good faith when claiming that the employee was
insubordinate, not whether that determination was accurate, objectively
reasonable, or consistent with prior decisions. The court is similarly
unconcerned with the factors that precipitated the plaintiff’s insubordinate
behavior or comments and is concerned only with the employer’s subjective
determination that it was inappropriate.
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, with its focus on the employer’s
subjective finding of insubordination, was echoed by the Sixth Circuit in a
2008 case involving a line-worker in a recycled paperboard plant.103 In Clack
v. Rock-Tenn Company, the court considered a case in which the plaintiff
walked off the floor of the plant to report perceived harassment rather than
comply with his supervisor’s direction.104 The court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that he was not actually insubordinate but was merely following a prior
instruction to immediately report harassment. Like the Seventh Circuit, the
court here concluded that:
[S]o long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason
given for its employment action and that honest belief is
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App’x 399 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id.
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reasonably grounded on particularized facts that were before it at
the time of the employment action, a plaintiff cannot establish
pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be
mistaken, foolish, trivial or baseless. . . . “[A]rguing about the
accuracy of the employer’s assessment is [merely] a distraction
because the question is not whether the employer’s reasons for a
decision are right but whether the employer’s description of its
reasons is honest.105
Again, the court focused on the subjective belief of the employer,
refusing to discuss the context in which the employee acted insubordinately
and any justification for his angry, hostile, or unruly behavior. Here, too, the
claim of insubordination receives little scrutiny — as long as it appears to be
a sincere belief on the part of the employer, it is almost automatically
accepted by the court as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
termination, precluding any further consideration of the retaliation claim.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits are by no means alone in this
determination. The Second Circuit, citing cases in the First, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits reached a similar conclusion and even more
explicitly explained the irrelevance of the factors that precipitated the
outburst including the fact that the plaintiff was responding to perceived
bias.106 Matima v. Celli involved a pharmacist employee who made
numerous complaints about perceived bias and unlawful actions taken
against him by his superiors.107 Unsatisfied with the response from his
employer, the plaintiff became increasingly more agitated in his discussions
with management.108 Ultimately, the employer terminated the plaintiff for
“gross insubordination,” claiming that the plaintiff had become unbearably
disruptive and had caused “such havoc and discontent in the lab that it was
not a suitable work environment for the remaining people on the staff.”109
While the facts in Matima, as relayed by the court, certainly suggest
that the employer was out of options and could no longer work with this
particular employee, the court’s rhetoric is not limited to such an extreme
situation and could be applied to curtail far less egregious behavior. Noting
the existence of complaints of bias in this case, the court explained:
We have held generally that insubordination and conduct that

105. Id. at 406 (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998) (italics
in original)(internal quotations omitted)).
106. Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming a jury finding that defendant’s
employment actions were motivated by unlawful retaliation).
107. Id. at 72-75.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 76.
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disrupts the workplace are legitimate reasons for firing an
employee. . . . We see no reason why the general principle would
not apply, even when a complaint of discrimination is
involved. . . . Many of our sister circuits have come to a similar
conclusion, holding that disruptive or unreasonable protests
against discrimination are not protected activity under Title VII
and therefore cannot support a retaliation claim.110
Again, here, the court notes that the context of the complaint is
irrelevant if the employer concludes that the manner in which the complaint
was made was somehow unacceptable or disruptive. It is easy to imagine a
scenario in which an employee who feels he is the victim of extreme
workplace bias might react less than professionally while complaining about
the discriminatory conduct. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit made clear that
the reason for the outburst is irrelevant so long as the employer honestly
believes it to be unacceptable.
Finally, at least one court has applied this logic to cases in which the
plaintiff’s outburst is physical in nature and is a response to sexually
aggressive behavior by a supervisor. In Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., the
plaintiff claimed that her supervisor commented on her erect nipples, which
lead to an altercation between the two, and finally, her supervisor “stepped
extremely close to Cruz and called her a ‘f____ing cunt.’”111 The plaintiff
responded by slapping her supervisor, who then placed her in a headlock.
The incident only ended when upper management intervened.112 The
employer eventually terminated both the plaintiff and her supervisor
“pursuant to Coach’s rule against ‘physical or verbal assault while on
110. Id. at 79 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Robbins v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
186 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., 132 F.3d 442,
445 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the court “must also consider whether [oppositional] conduct
was so disruptive, excessive, or ‘generally inimical to [the] employer’s interests . . . as to be
beyond the protection’ of [the retaliation provision of the ADEA]”); O’Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “[a]n employee’s
opposition activity is protected only if it is ‘reasonable in view of the employer’s interest in
maintaining a harmonious and efficient operation.’”); Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 202 U.S. App.
D.C. 102, 628 F.2d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding “[a] question of retaliation is not raised
by a removal for conduct inconsistent with [the employee’s] duties, unless its use as a mere
pretext is clear.”); Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222,
230 (1st Cir. 1976) (addressing “whether plaintiff’s overall conduct was so generally inimical
to her employer’s interests, and so ‘excessive,’ as to be beyond the protection of section 704(a)
even though her actions were generally associated with her complaints of illegal employer
conduct.”).
111. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating and
remanding a hostile work environment claim because the employee established at trial a
genuine factual dispute regarding that claim).
112. Id.
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company premises.’”113 In response to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the
court noted that “[s]lapping one’s harasser, even assuming arguendo that
Cruz did so in response to Title VII-barred harassment, is not a protected
activity.”114 The court opined that the plaintiff had other options including
leaving the room and reporting the incident to Human Resources. Finally,
in its most telling statement, the court noted that although the plaintiff
claimed that she believed her physical response to be in self-defense, the act
still does not receive protection under Title VII’s retaliation provision.115
Again, the court deemed plaintiff’s viewpoint to be irrelevant to the analysis.
The fact that the plaintiff in this case may very well have felt threatened by
her supervisor’s verbal and physical aggression did not aid her claim that her
opposition conduct should be protected.116 Again, the court generally
disregarded the context of the outburst, the reason for the plaintiff’s anger,
and the victim’s viewpoint overall, giving the employer something akin to
carte blanche so long as it sincerely believed the employee’s conduct to be
unacceptable.117
113. Id. at 564-65.
114. Id. at 566.
115. Id. at 567. The court did, however, specifically state: “We need not decide here
whether violence in opposition to Title VII-prohibited behavior might, in some circumstances,
be protected under Title VII’s retaliation provision.” Id.
116. There is at least one recent case that takes an opposing view on the issue of physical
resistance to sexual harassment. In Speed v. WES Healthcare Sys., the plaintiff alleged that
she was verbally sexually harassed for thirteen months by her co-worker and that she made
complaints to management at least twice during this time. 93 F. Supp. 3d 351, 354 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 26, 2015). The long period of verbal harassment culminated in a physical touching in
which the harasser groped her leg. Id. After the first touching, the plaintiff warned her coworker that if he touched her again, she would defend herself. When he then reached out to
touch her, she struck him on the side of his face, and he stopped his efforts. Id. After an
investigation, the employer determined that the co-worker had sexually harassed the plaintiff
but terminated both employees, one for sexual harassment and the other for physically
assaulting a co-worker. Id. at 354, 359. The court in Speed found for the plaintiff despite the
employer’s argument that the physical assault was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the termination. Id. at 364-65. In so doing, the court distinguished its holding from Cruz,
where the slap itself was the only purported opposition conduct whereas in Speed, the plaintiff
had complained to management multiple times. Id. at 360. The court then specifically
considered the viewpoint of the victim and concluded, “If physically striking her alleged
harasser resulted from the mindset of a person suffering ongoing harassment and fearing for
her bodily security, the proposition that Title VII would not afford Speed protection under
those circumstances seems inconsistent with the purposes of the statute.” Id. at 361.
117. In addition to the types of cases we discuss where the court views an angry complaint
as insubordination rather than protected opposition conduct, there are also cases in which the
“insubordination” is one factor among many that motivated the termination. Carle, supra note
18, at 204-07. In mixed motive cases, the employer’s liability is drastically reduced if it can
demonstrate that it would have taken the adverse action absent the retaliatory motive. Carle
supra note 18 at 204. But, as Susan Carle points out, “[l]ogically, if the decision-maker finds
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As is evident from the numerous cases described previously, despite a
seeming trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence to broaden retaliation
protection,118 the “objectively reasonable belief” doctrine and the “manner of
the complaint” doctrine are highly effective in dramatically narrowing the
conduct that ultimately receives retaliation protection. The next Section will
discuss existing scholarly critiques of these doctrines and proposals to undo
some of the damage they have created.
C. Scholarship on these Problematic Doctrines
This Article is by no means the first to raise concerns about these two
retaliation doctrines. A number of scholars have, over the last ten years,
taken issue with the narrow way in which courts have seen fit to protect
opposition conduct under these doctrines. These scholars have typically
focused on one doctrine or the other, and each scholar offers a different
approach to correct the problems created by these doctrines. Nonetheless,
their overall critiques focus on retaliation protection as serving the ultimate
goals of Title VII and the way in which these doctrines undermine those
goals. This Section will briefly discuss some of the existing scholarship in
this area in order to highlight the new lens that this article brings to the
discussion.
Deborah Brake’s 2005 article on retaliation protections was one of the
first recent works to focus exclusively and extensively on the subject of
retaliation.119 Brake posits that retaliation is a form of discrimination and
that protecting against it is integral to Title VII.120 With regard to the
“reasonable belief” doctrine, Brake makes clear that “as applied by courts,
the . . . doctrine severely undercuts the law’s protection of persons who
challenge inequality.”121 Beyond this general critique, Brake discusses
several specific problems with courts’ use of the doctrine in harassment cases
in particular. For example, she notes that its application “masks the
complexity of discrimination and squeezes out broader, competing
understandings.”122 The notion that a worker’s “reasonable belief” about the
that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating factor, it cannot then be said that the
employer had an independent legitimate reason for its action when it fires an employee for
insubordination related to or caused by that discrimination or retaliation.” Carle supra note
18, at 205. Nonetheless, courts often disregard this “logical point,” essentially taking the teeth
out of retaliation protection. Carle supra note 18 at 205.
118. See generally Berkowitz and Eisenstadt, supra note 24.
119. Brake, supra note 8.
120. Brake, supra note 8, at 20-22.
121. Brake, supra note 8, at 23.
122. Brake, supra note 8, at 86.
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unlawful nature of the underlying biased conduct is determined by the
court’s interpretation of statutory protections ignores the fact that courts,
relying on “common sense,” often reach vastly different conclusions when
interpreting Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes.123
Expecting an ordinary worker to understand the nuances in the law and
interpret workplace behavior as the court would is problematic to begin with
but is compounded by the fact that even courts disagree among themselves
about what is covered.124 In addition, Brake notes that average workers’
main sources of information about bias (and sexual harassment in particular)
are (1) cultural norms and (2) employee handbooks, both of which suggest
that a broad array of behaviors is unacceptable in the workplace despite the
fact that many of these behaviors would not rise to the level of unlawful
harassment.125 This makes it inordinately difficult for an employee to meet
the “reasonable belief” requirement in questionable situations. Moreover,
the “severity and pervasiveness” standard that courts apply to determine
whether harassment is unlawful means that an employee who complains too
early in the harassment period (i.e. after only one or two instances of
harassment) may be terminated without protection because the underlying
conduct has not yet become “pervasive.”126 Finally, Brake notes:
The double bind created by this standard is obvious: if the
employee waits too long to complain, she risks losing a potential
harassment claim for not having done enough to demonstrate that
the harassment was unwelcome, as well as for failing to meet an
affirmative defense if her failure to complain sooner was
“unreasonable.” In addition, certain harassment claims require
persons to complain internally as a prerequisite for institutional
liability, thus putting them in a risky position unless accorded full
protection from retaliation.127
Overall, Brake takes issue with the overly restrictive nature of the
“reasonable belief” doctrine, the way in which it inhibits employees with
serious complaints from coming forward, and the confusion it can create
among employees who are trying to protest biased workplaces.
Two years after Brake’s article, two more scholars tackled the
123. Brake, supra note 8, at 86-87.
124. Brake, supra note 8, at 89. As Brake notes, “the problem is not simply that most
people lack the legal expertise to ascertain where that line begins and ends, but that the
uncertainties of litigation prevent such a determination from being made in advance.”
125. Brake, supra note 8, at 86-87.
126. Brake, supra note 8, at 87-88.
127. Brake, supra note 8, at 88 (citing Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868, 873
(6th Cir. 1997) (requiring notice to establish employer liability for co-worker sexual
harassment)).
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“reasonable belief” doctrine exclusively, and suggested reforms to better
promote the purposes of Title VII. Lawrence Rosenthal, like Brake,
contends that the doctrine is overly restrictive and creates numerous
problems for victims of workplace discrimination.128 He suggests that
instead of requiring a plaintiff to prove both a subjective, good faith belief
that the underlying conduct she opposes is unlawful and that the belief was
objectively reasonable, that good faith on its own should be enough.129 In
support of this proposition, Rosenthal notes that his approach would further
Title VII’s goals by encouraging employees to come forward with
complaints.130 In addition, the good faith approach would be in keeping with
the notion that Title VII, as a remedial statute, should be interpreted
broadly.131 The subjective standard would eliminate the double bind
discussed by Brake and would create greater consistency among courts since
the issue would be the sincerity of the plaintiff’s belief (a factual matter)
rather than the objectively reasonable nature of the determination (a legal
conclusion).132 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rosenthal points out
the common sense nature of using a good faith standard:
Although requiring an objective component makes sense in the
context of a hostile environment claim, in which an employee is
seeking damages for an employer’s or a co-worker’s behavior,
requiring an objective component in an anti-retaliation case makes
no such sense, as the inappropriate conduct is not the basis of the
employer’s potential liability, but rather it is the employer’s
response to the employee’s complaint about that conduct that
forms the basis of any potential liability.133
Similarly, Brianne Gorod, argues for a rejection of the “reasonableness”
requirement and a replacement with an assessment of whether the plaintiff
was acting in good faith at the time of the complaint. 134 Gorod focuses on
the benefits of a good faith approach and particularly the benefits of
encouraging early reporting of harassment.135 Early reports have the capacity
to (1) prevent further harassment, (2) allow employees and employers to
conciliate claims and avoid the costs of litigation, (3) enable victims of
harassment to “ameliorate the psychological and dignitary harms that
128. Rosenthal, supra note 17.
129. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1130-31.
130. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131.
131. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131.
132. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131.
133. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 1131.
134. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s AntiRetaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469 (2007).
135. Id. at 1503-04.
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harassment causes,” and (4) most importantly, makes it easier to change
stereotypes that continue to permeate the workplace.136
Perhaps noting the agreement in the scholarly community with regard
to the critique of the doctrine but frustrated by the lack of any doctrinal
change, in the last several years, two additional scholars have written on this
topic with particularly innovative proposals. Matthew Green questions the
practicality of proposing a subjective standard given that courts generally
prefer objective standards in interpreting Title VII.137 Green’s proposal is to
use the objective standard but to expand the meaning of “reasonableness”
using a totality of the circumstances approach.138 For example, Green
suggests that to determine what constitutes “reasonable belief,” courts
should consider all of the factors that may influence the employee’s belief
including his identity (race, sex etc.) and the employer’s representations
about what constitutes discrimination and what to report to management. 139
Craig Senn’s piece on the “reasonable belief” doctrine is similarly
innovative.140 Recognizing the difficulty in eliminating the “reasonableness”
component of the standard, Senn proposes that courts interpret opposition
conduct to include a “reasonable action” option.141 Senn suggests moving
the inquiry away from whether the belief was reasonable in light of case law
precedent and focusing instead on whether the action the employee took was
reasonable in light of his honest belief. For example, instead of questioning
whether the employee’s belief that she was the victim of unlawful
discrimination was reasonable, the court should look at whether her
complaint to human resources was a reasonable action to take in light of her
honest belief.142 Again, both of these scholars present novel approaches with
the goals of protecting deserving employees and promoting the purpose and
goals of anti-discrimination laws.
The same focus is evident in the scholarship on the insubordination
defense. Terry Smith begins to tackle the problem with insubordination
cases in her article on “everyday indignities” and race discrimination.143 She
considers cases in which courts focus on the disruptive nature of the
employee’s complaint or response to perceived discrimination to the
exclusion of all else, including the underlying discrimination itself. In
particular, Smith discusses those actions and comments that appear minor to
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Green, supra note 22, at 763.
Green, supra note 22, at 763.
Green, supra note 22, at 764.
Senn, supra note 22.
Senn, supra note 22, at 2036.
Senn, supra note 22, at 2043-44
Smith, supra note 22, at 533.
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a court but have far greater significance to a member of a racial minority and
that, as a result, historical context, workplace context, and “cultural
meaning” are essential to understanding an employee’s response to
perceived bias.144 Smith argues that “[t]he employee who chooses to exercise
self-help in opposing workplace racism rather than remaining silent or
availing herself of the cumbersome and expensive recourse of formal charge
and suit is entitled to greater protection than the courts have heretofore
afforded.”145
Similarly, Susan Carle’s recent article on insubordination cases
considers several types of cases where this doctrine is used: (1) those in
which courts view the insubordination (even if mild) as the legitimate reason
for termination precluding recovery for the plaintiff, (2) those in which a
mixed motive analysis applies with the insubordination as one motive for
termination, and (3) those in which the court considers the reasonableness of
a plaintiff’s opposition conduct, finding it unprotected if it is unreasonable.146
Carle argues that there are numerous problems with courts’ approaches in
these cases — namely, that they demonstrate faulty logic, that they
undermine the objectives of Title VII, and that they create disincentives for
employees and employers to resolve disputes before litigation.147 In
response, Carle proposes several avenues to reform the problematic approach
used in these cases, looking primarily to NLRB precedents for guidance. As
she notes, federal courts and the NLRB have different tolerance levels for
angry employees.
Even if employees go a bit over the line in their efforts at selfadvocacy, the NLRB reasons that it is better to err in the direction
of protecting self-advocacy because doing so ensures more secure
protection of employees’ exercise of statutorily protected rights.
Under Title VII courts’ very different way of looking at employee
conduct, on the other hand, employee self-expression at the
moment of a dispute risks termination without later legal
protection. . . . [T]he current Title VII regime insists on a kind of
“sanitized workplace” where employees must behave with
decorum, remaining docile to the point of virtual passivity or risk
termination.148
Looking to NLRB precedents, Carle argues, will benefit employees and

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Smith, supra note 22, at 536-37.
Smith, supra note 22, at 533.
Carle, supra note 18, at 189.
Carle, supra note 18, at 186.
Carle, supra note 18, at 187-88.
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the underlying goals of Title VII.149
Although each of these scholars takes a slightly different approach to
the problem of overly narrow retaliation protection under the two doctrines
discussed, the focus of their critiques is essentially the same — these
doctrines undermine Title VII’s goal of eradication of workplace
discrimination by making it easier to punish employees who come forward
to complain. In so doing, these scholars also highlight the overwhelming
unfairness of the doctrines and the disservice they do to workers’ rights.
While we agree with these analyses, our approach is somewhat different.
The next Part will consider the impact of these doctrines on worker and
workplace health and will critique the doctrines from the viewpoint of
employers rather than only the workers.
II. RETALIATION DOCTRINES INCENTIVIZE UNHEALTHY WORKPLACE
BEHAVIOR
As is likely evident from a consideration of the jurisprudence and
scholarship on retaliation, the federal courts’ narrow approach to protecting
opposition conduct and hasty dismissals of cases where the employee
engaged in any disruptive behavior certainly undermine the primary goal of
Title VII — eradication of discrimination in the workplace.150 If employees
feel unsafe coming forward to report perceived bias, a large portion of
unlawful discriminatory conduct will go unreported and thus unanswered.
But the hesitation to report created by retaliation doctrines impacts more than
the continued existence of discrimination. Consideration of employees’
emotions and their impact on the workplace suggests that these doctrines
likely also impact employees’ overall health and the health of the
environment in which they spend the large majority of their time. This
Section will detail behavioral psychology research on anger in the
workplace, its benefits, problems, and consequences and will consider the
ways in which the previously-described retaliation doctrines serve to
incentivize unhealthy behavior.

149. See also Charles Sullivan, Taking Civility Too Far? WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Aug.
9, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/08/taking-civility-too-far.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/2FW2-6DBA ] (discussing problem of courts concluding that an em
ployer can legitimately fire an employee for “misconduct” during an EEOC mediation).
150. Brake, supra note 8, at 70-72.
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A. The Dual Threshold Model of Workplace Anger
There are a number of significant studies of anger in the workplace.151
This Article focuses on the dual threshold model of workplace anger because
it considers the impact of three forms of anger in the organization:
suppressed, expressed, and deviant.152 The model incorporates two
“thresholds” (expression and impropriety) that reflect organizational
emotion display norms and separate the three anger categories.153 The dual
threshold model identifies anger’s potential for both favorable and
unfavorable outcomes at work depending on the particular category of anger
present and the organization’s tolerance for anger expression. The model’s
authors argue that negative consequences are most likely with suppressed
and deviant anger.154
Suppressed workplace anger can take two forms. One is felt anger kept
silent inside oneself. Suppressed anger can also take the form of anger that
is deliberately hidden from those able to address the anger-provoking
incident, for example, management. As a result, this form of anger is

151. See generally JEFFREY W. KASSING, DISSENT IN ORGANIZATIONS (2011)
(summarizing current research in field of anger in organizations and proposing future
research); Donald E. Gibson & Ronda Roberts Callister, Anger in Organizations: Review and
Integration, 36 J. OF MGMT. 66 (2010); Theresa A. Domagalski & Lisa A. Steelman, The
Impact of Work Events and Disposition on the Experience and Expression of Employee Anger,
13 ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 31 (2005) (discussing the causes and expression of employee
anger); Julie Fitness, Anger in the workplace: an emotion script approach to anger episodes
between workers and their superiors, co-workers, and subordinates, 21 J. OF ORGANIZA
TIONAL BEHAV. 147 (2000) (investigating laypeople’s accounts of causes and effects of anger
in the workplace); Leigh L. Thompson, Janice Nadler, & Peter H. Kim, Some Like It Hot: The
Case for the Emotional Negotiator, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MGMT. OF
KNOWLEDGE (Leigh L. Thompson, et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that an emotional negotiator is
an effectiveness negotiator); Theresa M. Glomb & Charles L. Hulin, Anger and Gender
Effects in Observed Supervisor-Subordinate Dyadic Interactions, 72 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 281 (1997) (investigating the effects of supervisor’s
anger on evaluations of the supervisor and subordinate); Thomas M. Begley, Expressed and
Suppressed Anger as Predictors of Health Complaints, 15 J. OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 503
(1994) (examining the relationship between anger and health complaints).
152. See generally Deanna Geddes & Ronda R. Callister, Crossing the Line(s): A Dual
Threshold Model of Expressing Anger in Organizations, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REVIEW 721
(2007) (presenting a theoretical model of contextualized anger expression).
153. See John Van Maanen & Gideon Kunda, ‘Real feelings’: Emotional expression and
organizational culture, 11 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 43 (1989) (discussing the
disparity between emotions organizational members feel and those they express); Anat
Rafaeli & Robert I. Sutton, The expression of emotion in organizational life, in RES. IN
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1989) (discussing the
consequences of the emotions expressed by members of an organization).
154. Geddes and Callister, supra note 152.

EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

178

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/27/2018 3:20 PM

[Vol. 20.1

displayed only to people unrelated to the incident — including sympathetic
office mates. It fails to cross the organization’s expression threshold because
those who need to hear it to address the problem, do not, making it
organizationally silent.155
In contrast, when organizational members (i.e., employees) do display
their anger, but in a manner deemed inappropriate by the organization, it also
crosses an impropriety threshold. This becomes “deviant” anger – meaning
it deviates from formal or informal norms of what constitutes “appropriate”
emotion expression.156 The determination of what constitutes appropriate
expression can vary by industry, geographic region, and individual
organization.157 Anger becomes deviant either because it is viewed as an
improper emotional response to something that occurred in the workplace or
because the manner in which the emotion was expressed exceeded the norm
in that particular workplace.158
Expressed anger is best understood in relation to suppressed and deviant
anger. Expressed anger is simply the anger form found between the two
thresholds. It is anger conveyed to relevant parties in a manner deemed
acceptable by organizational members.159 Expressed anger is an “emotionbased form of employee voice.”160 It can be a form of challenging but
proactive expression of dissatisfaction in “an attempt to change, rather than
to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs.”161 Thus, expressed anger
can be a form of “prosocial dissent” reflecting an employee’s social
conscience in the workplace.162
The dual threshold model challenges traditional views that workplace
anger displays are, at best, unprofessional, and at worst, hostile actions.163
155. See Craig C. Pinder & Karen Harlos, Employee Silence: Quiescence and
Acquiescence as Response to Perceived Injustice, 20 RES. IN PERSONNEL AND HUMAN
RESOURCES MGMT. 331 (2001) (revealing additional meanings related to employee silence);
Elizabeth W. Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change
and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 706 (2000) (arguing that
organizational forces cause employees to withhold information on potential problems and
issues).
156. See Danielle E. Warren, Constructive and Destructive Deviance in Organizations,
28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 622 (2003) (discussing how employee deviance from organizational
norms can result in desirable and undesirable behavior); Geddes and Callister, supra note 152.
157. Geddes and Callister supra note 152.
158. Geddes and Callister, supra note 152.
159. Geddes and Callister, supra note 152.
160. Geddes and Callister, supra note 152, at 729.
161. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970).
162. Kassing, supra note 151.
163. See Deanna Geddes & Lisa T. Stickney, The trouble with sanctions: Organizational
responses to deviant anger displays at work, 64 HUMAN REL. 201 (2011) (exploring reactions

EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:20 PM

2017] SUPPRESS’D ANGER, RETAL’N DOCT., & WORKPLACE CULTURE 179

Intensely expressed anger, for instance, is commonly portrayed as
intentionally harmful, aggressive behavior, and thus, fundamentally
antisocial and destructive.164 The dual threshold model argues instead that
anger, rather than inherently aggressive or abnormal, is a natural response to
intolerable situations such as workplace injustice and impropriety.165
Displayed anger can provide valuable information to management,166 signal
problems or violations at work that could negatively impact fellow
employees and the organization,167 and help initiate necessary responses by
management that address existing problems and facilitate improved
organizational functioning and learning.168 Interpersonally, anger displays
provide opportunities for offending parties to apologize, redress the wrong,
and/or explain more clearly their position or intention.169 Given anger’s
potential to help change intolerable and unfair situations at work and
promote better understanding among organizational members, it should be
not only acceptable, but appreciated or even honored.170 In contrast, when
to employee anger expressions that deviate from emotional display norms).
164. Id. at 204-05.
165. See Daniel J. Canary, Brian H. Spitzberg, & Beth A. Semic, The Experience and
Expression of Anger in Interpersonal Settings, in HANDBOOK OF COMM. AND EMOTION: RES.,
THEORY, APPLICATION AND CONTEXTS 189 (Peter A. Andersen & Laura K. Guerrero eds.,
1998) (discussing how people experience and express anger in interpersonal relationships);
James R. Averill, Illusions of Anger, in AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INTERACTIONIST
PERSP. 171 (R. B. Felson & J. T. Tedeschi eds., 1993).
166. See Stéphane Côté, A Social Interaction Model of the Effects of Emotion Regulation
on Work Strain, 30 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 509 (2005) (discussing how regulation of emotion
in workplace impacts work strain); Gerald L. Clore, Karen Gasper, Erika Garvin, Affect as
Information, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION 121 (J.P. Forgas ed. 2001);
Deanna Geddes, Ronda Roberts Callister, Donald E. Gibson, A Message in the Madness:
Functions of Workplace Anger in Organizational Life, ACAD. OF MGMT. PER. (IN PRESS)
(examining common misunderstandings and unique challenges for managers, employees, and
women expressing anger at work); Mario Mikulincer, Adult Attachment Style and Individual
Differences in Functional Versus Dysfunctional Experiences of Anger, 74 J. OF PERSONALITY
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 513 (1998) (examining relationship between adult attachment and
anger).
167. See Michael W. Kramer & Jon A. Hess, Communication Rules for the Display of
Emotions in Organizational Settings, 16 MGMT. COMM. Q. 66 (2002) (examining general
communication rules that dictate emotion management in organization); Sandra L. Robinson
& Rebecca J. Bennett, A Typology of Deviant Workplace Behaviors: A Multidimensional
Scaling Study, 38 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 555 (1995) (suggesting that deviant workplace
behaviors vary based on two dimensions).
168. See Quy Nguyen Huy, Emotional Capability, Emotional Intelligence, and Radical
Change, 24 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 325 (1999) (presenting multilevel theory of emotion and
change).
169. Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
170. See Debra E. Meyerson, If Emotions Were Honoured: A Cultural Analysis, in
EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 167 (S. Fineman ed. 2000) (arguing that social world and social
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employees feel unable to express anger and dissent, they can retain silent
rage and possibly engage in retaliatory behavior in an effort to “seek justice”
for wrongs committed against them.171
Believing in expressed anger’s potential to promote favorable outcomes
at work is easiest if one finds the displayed anger to be a reasonable response
to unjust or inappropriate actions by another. Particularly relevant to this
concept is the “placement” of the two thresholds. The threshold placement
is symbolic of an organization’s idiosyncratic notions of “acceptable”
emotional expression at work. As such, deviant anger, in particular, is a
relative concept.172 Assessment of anger display propriety reflects salient
codes of conduct in relation to the manner of expression. For instance, in
some workplaces, cursing under one’s breath could be considered
unacceptable, while other work environments allow heated emotional
exchanges. Given that threshold placement is dynamic and dependent on
varied cultural norms, organizational tolerance for anger displays can range
from limited to broad.173 Organizations also may restrict displayed employee
anger to such a degree that essentially no space exists between the expression
and impropriety thresholds.174 In these environments, any displayed anger
by employees is seen as inappropriate, and hence, punishable.175 When this
occurs, organizations promote suppressed anger among employees.176
Even with restrictive anger display norms in the organization,
situational circumstances may help expand the space between the expression
and impropriety thresholds. This enhanced opportunity to display anger
reduces the tendency to judge expressed anger as “crossing the line” into
deviant anger. Consequently, if an employee finds a situation highly
provocative, unethical, or discriminatory and responds angrily, those
observing this emotional display may find it completely appropriate, “given
the circumstances.”177 When organizational members show “forbearance,”
or increased leniency given circumstances leading to one’s anger, they help
eliminate the moniker of deviant anger, and correspondingly, prevent

science would be profoundly different if emotions were honored).
171. See Leslie Perlow & Stephanie Williams, Is Silence Killing Your Company?, 81
HARV. BUS. REV. 52 (2003) (discussing the detrimental cost of silence to firms and
individuals); Robert J. Bies & Thomas M. Tripp, A Passion for Justice: The Rationality and
Morality of Revenge, in JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE 197, 204 (R. Cropanzano ed. 2000)
(discussing the social perceptions and consequences of revenge).
172. See generally Warren, supra note 156.
173. See generally Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
174. Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
175. Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
176. Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
177. Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
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sanctions against the angry employee.178 Overall, the more space between
the expression and impropriety thresholds, or “zone of expressive
tolerance,”179 the more organizational members will find employee anger
expression acceptable and punitive actions unnecessary. In contrast, less
space between thresholds symbolizes a more constraining and sanctioning
culture, one with limited opportunities for “expressed” anger and increased
instances of “deviant” and “suppressed” anger.180
Research testing the dual threshold model generally supports its key
propositions regarding potential benefits of workplace anger expression. For
instance, in a study of deviant anger displays, results indicate that supportive
responses by management and coworkers promoted favorable situational
change at work, while sanctioning or doing nothing following these intense
outbursts did not.181 Management responding to angry employees in a more
supportive, rather than sanctioning manner, was seen as a way to “expand
the space” between thresholds and promote more positive outcomes from
expressed anger.182 Most interesting was the fact that researchers found no
correlation between firing the angry individual and the belief among coworkers that the situation improved at work.183 In many instances, deviant,
unexpected and intense angry outbursts reflect “state” versus “trait” anger,184
demonstrating a serious issue within the work environment, rather than
within the supposed “troublemaker.” For example, an intense outburst often
reveals previously unexposed but widely felt unfairness, bias, or harassment
of some kind as opposed to a personality trait in the employee who finally
broke and exposed her anger.
In addition, there is increasing research on the positive implications of
an employee’s expression of anger. Recent research reports that higher
levels of organizational commitment and positive affectivity prompt
employees to express anger, while lower levels of organizational
commitment and negative affectivity increase the tendency to suppress anger
178. George Nelson & John Dyck, Forbearance in leadership: Opportunities and risks
involved in cutting followers some slack, 16 LEADERSHIP Q. 53 (2005).
179. Stephen Fineman, EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS (1993); Stephen Fineman,
Emotional arenas revisited, in EMOTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 1 (Stephen Fineman ed. 2000)
(discussing science of emotional interactions between colleagues in close workplace settings).
180. See generally Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
181. See generally Geddes & Stickney, supra note 163.
182. Geddes & Stickney, supra note 163, at 221.
183. Geddes & Stickney, supra note 163, at 221. Those surveyed were witnesses to the
anger episode.
184. See Charles D. Spielberger, Susan S. Krasner, & Eldra P. Solomon, The experience,
expression, and control of anger, in INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, STRESS, AND HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 89 (Michel Pierre Janisse ed. 1988) (discussing the wide range of reactions
presented among people to the same stimuli, including those thought to provoke anger).
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at work.185 These findings challenge those who characterize employee anger
expression as deviant, inappropriate, and/or insubordinate and provide data
demonstrating that emotionally strong, optimistic, and prosocial employees
express anger at work, typically to the betterment of the organization.186
The reverse is also clear in the research as studies of suppressed versus
expressed anger overwhelmingly show a strong relationship between
suppressed anger and negative workplace and relational outcomes.187
Research on suppressed anger identifies problems both with silent anger,
kept inside oneself, as well as anger that is “organizationally silent,” meaning
it is displayed only to people unrelated to the incident, including sympathetic
office mates. When anger is kept silent and unspoken, also known as “angerin,”188 employees believe the benefits of keeping quiet outweigh the costs of
speaking up. They may decide the issue is not significant, not worth the
hassle of a challenge, or too costly due to the potential for negative
repercussions. However, significant research is clear that efforts to hide
negative emotion, especially when one wants to speak out,189 produce
detrimental cognitive, psychological, and physiological effects.190 These can
include rumination, where the person cannot remove the incident from his or

185. See Lisa T. Stickney & Deanna Geddes, Positive, proactive, and committed: The
surprising connection between good citizens and expressed (vs. suppressed) anger at work, 7
NEGOT. AND CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 243 (2014) (outlining surprising connections between an
employee’s expression of anger to workplace management and that employee’s commitment
to the organization).
186. Id.
187. Id. See also Lisa T. Stickney & Deanna Geddes, More than just “blowing off
steam”: The roles of anger and advocacy in promoting positive outcomes at work 9 NEGOT.
AND CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 141 (2016) (identifying whether advocacy on behalf of an upset
coworker can improve workplace relations); Deanna Geddes & Lisa T. Stickney, Muted anger
in the workplace: Changing the “sound” of employee emotion through social sharing, in
EXPERIENCING AND MANAGING EMOTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE: RES. ON EMOTION IN
ORGANIZATIONS 85 (Charmine E.J. Härtel Neal M. Ashkanasy, Wilfred J. Zerbe ed. 2012)
(researching the relationship between anger intensity and organizational commitment and the
likelihood of one employee to advocate for another).
188. See generally Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, supra note 184.
189. See JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF CONFIDING ON
OTHERS (1990) (proposing that self-disclosure can lead to health benefits).
190. See Jane M. Richards & James J. Gross, Composure at any cost? The cognitive
consequences of emotion suppression, 25 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 1033
(1999) (identifying negative health consequences of chronic emotional suppression).
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her mind,191 feelings of humiliation or resentment,192 demoralization,193 and
physical problems including raised blood pressure and heart disease.194
Studies show that similarly negative consequences result from the other
form of suppressed anger as well, where employees intentionally hide their
anger from management (or those responsible for their frustration) and
instead vent to sympathetic coworkers. The dual threshold model labels this
suppression “muted” or “muffled” anger.195 Research shows that such anger
often causes “negative emotional contagion,” where the employee’s anger is
transferred to others originally unaware of and uninvolved in the initial
incident.196 This, in turn, can damage employee morale and raise indignation
among sympathetic colleagues who support their coworker.197 Ironically,
until management hears of the employees’ anger, the problematic situation
remains unaddressed and unresolved and may, in fact, escalate.198
The implications are clear: Organizations and management benefit by
recognizing that expressed anger by employees can promote favorable
workplace outcomes. As a consequence, it is ultimately beneficial to an
organization to provide opportunities and even incentives for angry
employees to come to management and speak up, rather than hide their anger
or only share it with people unrelated to the problem who are not in a position
to help make necessary changes at work. Employees willing to approach
management to express disapproval and indignation over perceived
unethical, illegal, or insensitive practices or policies at work more often than
not reflect a strong commitment to their company, their colleagues, and their
work.199
191. See Dianne M. Tice & Roy F. Baumeister, Controlling anger: Self-induced emotion
change, in HANDBOOK OF MENTAL CONTROL 393 (Daniel M. Wegner & James W. Pennebaker
eds., 1993) (discussing research and theories of how an individual’s mental state progresses
or deteriorates when attempting to control anger).
192. See generally Perlow & Williams, supra note 171.
193. See Gina Vega & Debra R. Comer, Sticks and stones may break your bones, but
words can break your spirit: Bullying in the workplace, 58 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 101 (2005)
(identifying the negative effects of bullying in the workplace, both on individual mental
wellbeing and organization productivity as a whole).
194. See generally Begley, supra note 151.
195. See generally Geddes & Callister, supra note 152.
196. Sigal G. Barsade, The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on
Group Behavior, 47 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 644 (2002) (analyzing the phenomenon of a team of
workers being more likely to share similar moods and its potential impact on performance).
197. Callister, R. R., Geddes, D., & Gibson, D. E. 2017. When is anger helpful or hurtful?
Status and role impact on anger expression and outcomes, 10(2) NEGOT. AND CONFLICT
MGMT. RESEARCH, 69-87 (2017).
198. See Stickney & Geddes (2014), supra note 187, at 252 (distinguishing beneficial
instances of anger and expressions of anger from detrimental ones).
199. Stickney & Geddes (2014), supra note 187, at 252.
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B. Retaliation Doctrines’ Impact on Anger Expression
Both the “reasonable belief” doctrine and the “manner of the complaint”
doctrine have the effect of incentivizing anger suppression among
employees. In the first instance, it is clear that if complaints about biased
conduct go unprotected — unless the employee is complaining about
conduct that a court would consider to be unlawful — most employees who
are untrained in the law will choose to remain silent, not wanting to risk
demotion or termination without legal recourse. Similarly, if an employee
has to worry about becoming agitated, angry, or somehow disruptive when
complaining about harassment or discrimination and thus losing his right to
retaliation protection, he will likely choose not to complain at all.
1. Reasonable Belief Doctrine and Suppression
In terms of the “reasonable belief” doctrine, there are three likely
potential outcomes once employees begin to understand that only a narrow
portion of their complaints will be protected and that they cannot effectively
predict when they are at risk: (1) employees may keep quiet, choosing not to
tell anyone about the potentially discriminatory conduct, (2) they may tell
their co-workers but not a supervisor, or (3) they may choose to report the
conduct directly to a federal or state agency and bypass the employer’s
internal investigation mechanisms.
First, it is highly likely that employees will simply choose to remain
silent in the face of a potential risk of adverse action without protection. If,
to be protected, an employee must be relatively certain that the conduct of
which he is complaining would meet the legal definition of an unlawful
employment practice as interpreted by the federal circuit in which he would
bring his case, most of the time he will, and probably should, choose not to
complain. As the Court in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville & Davidson County, noted:
If it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination . . . could be penalized with no remedy, prudent
employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII
offenses against themselves or against others. This is no imaginary
horrible given the documented indications that fear of retaliation
is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their
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concerns about bias and discrimination. 200
Although the act of keeping silent in the face of harassment or
discrimination may be a reasonable legal choice in light of the existing
precedent, it will likely have a significant impact on the employee’s
emotional life. It is uncontroversial to imagine that anger (and humiliation,
fear, frustration and a host of other negative emotions) is a likely result when
one feels himself to be a victim of harassment or some other form of
discriminatory conduct. As a result, the choice not to complain also means
that the employee is likely holding in his or her anger despite the negative
effects. This “anger-in” form of anger suppression does not mean that the
anger dissipates or resolves. On the contrary, the anger continues to
negatively affect the employee’s mental and physical state regardless of the
fact that it has been suppressed.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: A female employee
endures sexual comments from her co-workers every few months. The
comments are directed at her and occasionally at other women and involve
female body parts, sexual acts, and her co-workers’ sexual experiences.
There is no physical touching, and her co-workers often have a playful tone
and laugh briefly before returning to work. The comments are infrequent —
they do not come every day or even every week but are sporadic and
unpredictable. And yet, the comments begin to loom large in the employee’s
psyche. She is constantly waiting for the next comment, building up her
defenses, imagining what she might say in response, steeling herself for what
feels to her like an attack.
This employee has seen something similar happen before. Her
colleague at her prior position in the company endured a similar situation
involving racial comments. But in that instance, the employee went to
management to complain about the comments. Management initially told
him there would be an investigation but nothing much came of it. Instead,
at the mid-year review, the complaining employee was terminated, allegedly
for coming late to work several times without an excuse. When the employee
filed suit for retaliation, his case was dismissed at summary judgment. The
female target of sexual comments cannot be sure that her own situation rises
to the level of a hostile work environment (if she even knows that term) and,
in fact, different courts would likely reach different conclusions when
presented with the facts in her case.201 And so, recalling her colleague’s
200. 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009) (citing Brake, supra note 8, at 20 (internal quotations
omitted)).
201. See Gorod, supra note 134, at 1490 (finding that “[i]n determining whether conduct
is ‘severe or pervasive,’ the Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to consider ‘all the
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
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situation and the rejection in the courts, she chooses to do nothing about her
own predicament.
But her choice to remain silent has consequences of its own. She
becomes increasingly upset and angry, has trouble focusing on anything else,
and eventually her work begins to suffer. She misses deadlines, appears
distracted and unfocused at meetings, and begins to avoid interactions with
many of her colleagues despite the social nature of her work. Her silence
does nothing to dissipate her anger and, in fact, may actually allow it to grow,
ultimately making her a far less effective worker and a troubled person.202 In
addition to affecting her own mental state, the employee’s failure to express
her anger means that management is either not aware of the inappropriate
conduct or knows about it but assumes it is not negatively affecting
employees. Management thus allows it to continue, thereby tacitly signaling
that it is acceptable behavior, which, in turn, leads other employees to act
similarly, perpetuating and even growing the problem.203
Alternatively, as a second possibility, instead of complaining to
management or remaining silent, the employee who feels victimized by the
sexual conduct may begin telling her co-workers about it. She is, in essence,
complaining to her equals rather than complaining to a superior who might
be able to do something about the problem. In other words, she is displaying
the “muffled anger” form of suppression. The employee’s co-workers, in
turn, can do nothing to help but become upset on her behalf and begin to feel
angry that they work in an environment where such behavior is tolerated.
This “emotional contagion” then impacts the effectiveness of numerous
workers and not just the initial victim. The first two possibilities thus result
in (1) an increase in anger and discontent, (2) possible spread of anger
beyond the initial victim, and (3) a perception that the employer permits such
discriminatory behavior, likely leading to more anger, more misconduct in
the future, and eventually a culture permeated with bias and discontent.
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ Thus, the Court has tried to
provide some guidance as to when conduct is unlawful, but that guidance hardly provides
definitive answers as to how a court will rule in any given case.”).
202. See infra text accompanying notes 204-06. Victims of sexual harassment often
report that they become focused on the harassment and find themselves unable to focus on or
perform their work effectively at some point. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
22 (1993) (holding that “[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does
not seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing in their careers.”) (cited in Margaret E. Johnson, Avoiding Harm Otherwise”:
Reframing Women Employees’ Responses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80 TEMP. L.
REV. 743, 770 (2007)).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
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Finally, the third likely possible response in this scenario is that the
employee, fearing repercussions for complaining internally, will seek to
protect herself by complaining directly to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the equivalent state agency.204 Under
the “participation clause” in Title VII’s retaliation provision, employees who
file a charge or participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing are
protected against retaliation, regardless of the merits of the underlying
discrimination claim.205 While this option certainly provides a forum for the
employee to channel her anger, it is likely not the most desirable option from
the employer’s perspective. Answering an EEOC charge requires time,
resources, and potentially assistance from legal counsel. The eventual
litigation costs can grow quickly should the employee proceed with filing a
lawsuit.206 It is far easier and more efficient for the employer to resolve
situations internally and avoid the costs and demands of the agency and court
systems.
The first two possibilities—internal anger suppression and “muffled
anger” — both have negative outcomes that compound the already harmful
nature of discrimination in the workplace. A number of commentators have
explained the devastating impact of sexual harassment on its victims.
“Sexual harassment harms its victims psychologically, physically, and
financially, producing serious, even devastating, effects. One commentator
has gone so far as to liken it to a form of psychological pollution that corrodes
the well-being of . . . [its] victims.”207 Similarly, Terry Smith describes the
significant psychological and physical injury that results from racial
discrimination.208 For example, she describes a study of black women who
experienced “increased cardiovascular reactivity and emotional distress
when confronted with racist provocation.”209
204. Of course, as described in the Introduction, the employee may also make the choice
to leave her job and subsequently take her complaints online. See supra text accompanying
notes 1-8. A former employee tweeting and blogging about alleged discrimination can be a
public relations nightmare for a company even without a lawsuit. The benefit to handling
such complaints internally should be obvious.
205. 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–3(a); Brake, supra note 8, at 79, n.201.
206. See Jean Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (finding that
“[f]rom the employer’s perspective, the litigation system is also quite problematic. First, it is
very time consuming and expensive, so that even those employers who believe they have valid
defenses to claims of discrimination find they are paying a great deal in legal fees.”).
207. Gorod, supra note 134, at 1513 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
208. Smith, supra note 22, at 545-52.
209. Smith, supra note 22, at 547 (citing Maya Dominguez et al., Effects of Racist
Provocation and Social Support on Cardiovascular Reactivity in African American Women,
2 INT’L J. BEHAV. MED. 321, 321-22 (1995)).
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The harm that results from the underlying conduct is compounded when
the victim feels the need to suppress his or her powerful emotional response
to the biased conduct. As Gorod notes, “if women come to believe that they
cannot speak out about . . . harassment – that they cannot give voice to their
feelings of frustration, anger, and fear – it seems reasonable to believe that
those feelings, borne of the initial harassment but compounded by the forced
silence, will manifest themselves in other, potentially destructive, ways.”210
Smith describes a Harvard University and Kaiser Foundation study of
working class black women and men that found just such destructive results
when victims keep silent:
Working-class black women who responded to discriminatory
treatment by accepting it as inevitable and remaining silent about
it posted higher blood pressure levels than those who tried to
respond to unfair treatment and who shared their experiences with
others. Likewise, among working-class black men, those reporting
that they usually accepted their unfair treatment as a fact of life
reported higher systolic blood pressure than those who tried to
respond to unfair treatment.211
Moreover, it is clear from the psychological research described in the
prior Section that we don’t need to imagine the harms caused by suppressed
anger and emotion. Those harms are real, having been studied and
documented, and they take both psychological and physical forms and
impact both the victims themselves as well as the workplace overall.212 Thus,
while harassment and other forms of discrimination clearly take a severe toll
on victims, the failure to fully protect those victims against retaliation and
the victims’ resulting choices to remain silent and suppress the emotional
responses to it has its own extremely detrimental impact on workers and the
working environment.
2. “Manner of the Complaint” Doctrine and Suppression
As with the “reasonable belief” doctrine, courts’ proclivity to dismiss
retaliation claims when the employer alleges insubordination as its legitimate
reason for termination also has the effect of incentivizing suppression of
anger in the workplace. In addition, this approach tends to ignore
psychological research on the contextual nature of anger and its acceptability
210. Gorod, supra note 134, at 1515 (emphasis added).
211. Smith, supra note 22, at 547 (citing Nancy Krieger & Stephen Sidney, Racial
Discrimination and Blood Pressure: The CARDIA Study of Young Black and White Adults,
86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1370, 1373-74 (1996)).
212. See supra Part II. A.
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in a variety of workplaces.
First, and most importantly, the almost automatic dismissal of cases
when insubordination is alleged creates a clear takeaway message for
employees: unless you complain (about harassment, discrimination, or
anything else) in the most respectful manner possible, you run a significant
risk of losing your eventual retaliation claim because any disruptive behavior
can be deemed unacceptable and grounds for termination without recourse
in the law. The suppression of anger that will likely result from this approach
is clear. Anger is a natural human emotion that often arises when we feel
victimized by injustice.213 When employees begin to see that any display of
anger may be used against them when making complaints, the reasonable
response is to suppress all complaints in an attempt to suppress the emotions
that will inevitably escape them. If employees cannot trust themselves to
complain without becoming angry, disruptive, or hostile, they will often
choose to say nothing at all.
As a secondary but still important matter, the way in which courts have
approached the insubordination issue suggests that they are relying on
“common sense” without considering the existing research on the way in
which anger manifests, is tolerated, and is dealt with in the workplace.
Recall the Seventh Circuit’s approach to an employer’s use of the
insubordination defense in McClendon. The court explicitly stated that it
was “not relevant whether Mr. McClendon actually was insubordinate.”214
Instead, the court was concerned only with the employer’s good faith belief
that the employee’s behavior was unacceptable215 In the large majority of
cases, courts, not wanting to question employers’ business judgment or delve
too far into “the weeds,” simply accept the employer’s assertion that the
determination of insubordination was legitimate.216 Thus, the mere
allegation of insubordination is enough to defeat a retaliation claim. In
addition, several courts have made clear that the factors leading to the
disruptive outburst are similarly irrelevant to the analysis.217 But as the
Geddes and Stickney research demonstrates, the factors that contribute to a
finding of deviant anger or anger that crosses the threshold from acceptable
to unacceptable are not static nor does the determination lend itself to a single
standard.218 Instead, that determination is different for every organization

213. See supra Part II. A.
214. McClendon, 108 F.3d at 799.
215. Id.
216. See Carle, supra note 18, at 201-09 (outlining cases in which courts deferred to
employer assertions of insubordination).
217. Carle, supra note 18, at 201-09.
218. See supra Part II.A.
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and may, in fact, differ even within an organization depending on the context
and dynamics that led to the particular outburst at issue.219
Anger may be deemed deviant because the employee works in an
environment that tolerates no emotional expressions at all, because the
volume and tone of the expression exceeded the acceptable standards in a
workplace that tolerates a moderate level of anger expression, or because the
factors leading to the outburst do not justify the type of expression.220 The
notion that courts should blindly accept an employer’s subjective assessment
that the employee was insubordinate without consideration of what made the
expression “deviant” ignores the reality of workplace cultures. To deprive a
worker of retaliation protection without consideration of the context of the
outburst is irresponsible at best. It feels particularly egregious in cases of
discrimination where the impact on the employee may be profound and
should not be ignored. As Terry Smith has pointed out,
Courts cannot intelligently evaluate the permissible bounds of
opposition conduct without some appreciation of the nature of the
harm the employee is opposing. Concomitantly, courts cannot
properly assess opposition conduct without an understanding of
the effects of perceived discrimination on the minority worker and,
thus, the psychological and physiological factors that inform and
shape his opposition conduct.221
C. Using the Dual Threshold Model as a Guide to Reforming
Retaliation Doctrine
The Geddes/Callister dual threshold model of workplace anger reaches
several important conclusions that are relevant to retaliation doctrine. First,
the overall conclusion that the expression of anger in the workplace is
generally positive both for the individual and for the workplace as a whole
should impact employers’ views of the incentive structure created by existing
legal doctrine and precedents. Second, the emphasis on the contextual nature
of anger and varying degrees of anger acceptance should impact the way in
which courts approach cases involving angry employees. What follows is a
proposal to reform the two retaliation doctrines discussed above in a way
that should serve the goals of Title VII, allow for more context-based and
nuanced legal conclusions, and yield healthier workplaces. It bears repeating
that although the health and culture of a workplace is not the concern of Title
VII, it is, or should be, the concern of employers. As a result, consideration
219. See supra Part II.A.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
221. Smith, supra note 22, at 545.

EISENSTADT & GEDDES_FINAL_EIC ADJUSTMENTS - COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:20 PM

2017] SUPPRESS’D ANGER, RETAL’N DOCT., & WORKPLACE CULTURE 191

of the dual threshold model should push employers to support changes to
retaliation doctrine that workers’ advocates have been promoting for some
time.
1. Court-Created Doctrines and Reforms
Before delving into our reform proposal, it is important to point out that
the doctrines and approaches discussed in this article are entirely court
created. There is nothing in the statutory language of Title VII or other antidiscrimination statutes that compels courts to define protected opposition
conduct as requiring that the employee possess an “objectively reasonable
belief” that the conduct about which he is complaining would be viewed as
unlawful by the relevant court.222 As Deborah Brake has pointed out,
The standard explanation for the tighter requirement applied to
Title VII retaliation claims under the opposition clause is that
Congress did not write the opposition clause to encompass as
broad a level of protection as afforded under the participation
clause. However, the use of the reasonable belief doctrine does
not follow from any linguistic differences between the two clauses,
but rather from a desire to protect employer prerogatives to
retaliate against persons who raise complaints in the workplace
that stray too far from dominant legal understandings of
discrimination.223
As a result, the incentives and practical reality created by this courtcreated standard can and should be considered by courts when deciding
whether and how to apply it.
Similarly, the approach courts take in insubordination cases is not based
on any statutory imperative.224 The decision to consider insubordination as
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination or to conclude that the
manner in which an employee complained about discrimination exceeded
the bounds of reasonableness and thus left him unprotected against
retaliation is a creation of courts alone. Thus, as Susan Carle notes with
respect to her proposals on this issue, “the reforms suggested do not require
major statutory reforms but instead doctrinal tweaks that courts can make in
222. See Brake, supra note 8, at 102-03 (finding that “[h]aving recognized that protection
of oppositional activities is not limited to complaints about practices that are actually illegal,
there is nothing in the language of Title VII’s opposition clause that requires courts to use a
reasonable belief standard as the boundary for such claims, and certainly not one bounded to
dominant judicial interpretations of current legal precedent.”).
223. Brake, supra note 8, at 103, n.293 (citing Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d
1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
224. See Carle, supra note 18, at 210 (noting tweaks to the doctrine made by the courts).
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exercising their interstitial interpretative power in applying law to facts.”225
2. History of Considering Incentives in Creating Employment
Doctrine
In addition to reforms being somewhat straightforward in this area since
statutory changes are unnecessary, reforms of these doctrines based on
consideration of the incentives they create should also fit with courts’ general
approach and concerns in the Title VII arena. Courts assessing Title VII
cases have, for decades, been interested in the incentive structures that flow
from the extra-statutory doctrines they create.
This incentives-focused concern is perhaps most evident in the
Ellerth/Faragher cases in which the Supreme Court created an affirmative
defense to Title VII discrimination claims in order to incentivize certain
behavior on the part of employers. In Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth,226
the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment at the hands of a mid-level manager
who made offensive remarks and gestures, including threats to deny her
tangible job benefits.227 Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,228 a
lifeguard employed by the city alleged sexual harassment by two of her
immediate male supervisors.229 The Court established in these cases that an
employer could be liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment by
a supervisor even when no tangible employment action is taken against the
alleged victim of harassment.230 Most importantly, for our purposes, in these
cases, the Supreme Court also created (without any statutory requirement)
an affirmative defense to sexual harassment claims that looked to “the
reasonableness of the employer’s conduct as well as that of a plaintiff
victim.”231 More specifically, the Court held that a “defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages” by demonstrating “(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”232 The
primary motivation for creating this affirmative defense was a desire to
incentivize specific behavior on the part of employers, as made clear in
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Carle, supra note 18, at 210.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Id. at 747-48.
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
Id. at 780.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 808.
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Ellerth:
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer
liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such
procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context. . . . To
the extent limiting employer liability could encourage employees
to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive,
it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.233
The Court in Faragher further provided:
It would . . . implement clear statutory policy and complement the
Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the
employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge
their duty. Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability for misuse of
supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it
failed to provide employers with some such incentive.234
It is clear from the Ellerth/Faragher opinions that the Court is not only
concerned with the real-world consequences of its conclusions but that the
way in which its doctrines impact employer and employee behavior is a
primary concern that, in fact, motivates doctrinal innovations.
In the context of retaliation doctrine, the Supreme Court made a similar
incentive-based determination when defining the term “adverse employment
action” for purposes of retaliation suits. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway v. White,235 the Court considered what standard should apply when
determining whether adverse conduct constituted possible retaliation.236 The
Court determined that the definition of adverse conduct in the retaliation
context should be different from that in the discrimination context. Whereas
in discrimination cases, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct he
complains of constitutes “a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,”237 in
the retaliation context, the Court adopted a broader standard under which “a
plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

524 U.S. at 764.
524 U.S. at 806.
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 75-76 (Alito, J. concurring).
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charge of discrimination.”238
In explaining this different approach, the Court focused on the realworld impact of the standard it applies. “By focusing on the materiality of
the challenged action and the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position, we believe this standard will screen out trivial conduct
while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees
from complaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.”239 The
Court recognized that the way in which it defined “adverse action” would
either have the effect of encouraging or deterring complaints about
discrimination and chose the course that would encourage employees to
come forward.240
These significant decisions reinforce the importance of the real-world
impact of employment doctrine on the creation of those doctrines. Absent
clear statutory direction, courts consistently look to the incentive structures
created by their conclusions and to the behavior of employers and employees
that are desirable and likely to result from their decisions. In something akin
to a “legal realism” approach, courts in the employment context often seek
“to understand legal rules in terms of their social consequences.”241 It is in
this context that we suggest doctrinal reform of the retaliation doctrines
discussed in this article and that we propose consideration of the impact these
doctrines have on employee health and workplace culture.
3. Employer-Employee Alignment of Interests
While consideration of incentives is a regular component of doctrinal
discussions in the Title VII context, it is less common to find a doctrinal

238. Id. at 68 (internal quotations omitted).
239. Id. at 69-70.
240. Id. at 69. Interestingly, the Court also noted the way in which the real-world behavior
it was focused on could itself have varied meanings and impacts depending on context.
“Context matters. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. A
schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers,
but may matter enormously to a young mother with school age children. A supervisor’s
refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to
retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly
to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from
complaining about discrimination.”
241. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 468-69
(1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)) (holding
that judges hope to make decisions more predictable by focusing on both the specific facts of
cases, and social reality in general).
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proposal that has benefits for both employers and employees alike. Our
proposal to reform specific retaliation doctrines to incentivize anger
expression does just that. The benefits to workers are obvious in that
expanded protection from retaliation ultimately encourages more workers to
come forward with complaints, increasing the efficacy of the
antidiscrimination laws in protecting workers. As we have discussed above,
although it may seem counterintuitive, employers also ultimately benefit
from an environment in which workers feel comfortable coming forward and
expressing their anger and distress.
We have focused on the organizational behavior research on workplace
anger expression but this notion of a healthy workplace culture that supports
complaints and emotional expression is already beginning to take hold
among business leaders and advisors. From the perspective of litigation
avoidance, corporate counsel generally recognize the benefits of early
complaints that allow for conciliation or some form of alternative dispute
resolution rather than costly court battles.242 As Deborah Thompson
Eisenberg points out in her recent article, the increasing effort at conciliation
has also grown out of “dramatic changes in the structure of many
organizations” from top-down hierarchies to “team-based work” that spreads
out the control and decision making authority243 Given this new
organizational structure, employers must take new steps to attract and retain
talent including developing “conflict management systems that give
employees a greater sense of empowerment, voice, and self-determination in
addressing workplace issues.”244
Corporate counsel and compliance professionals also point out that to
limit or eliminate bad behavior in the workplace, employers must focus on
more than policies and complaint systems and should turn their attention to
workplace culture. As corporate consultants advise:
The only thing that can prevent corporate misconduct is an

242. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, The Restorative Workplace: An Organizational
Learning Approach to Discrimination 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 487, 490 (citing SEYFARTH
SHAW, LLP, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 3 (2014
ed.), http://www.seyfarth-classaction.com/2014/2014wcar/index.html.)) [https://perma.cc
/88BK-V6WY] (finding that when an employee raises a concern or, even worse, files a lawsuit
alleging discrimination or harassment, a highly disruptive and expensive prospect occurs).
243. Id. at 491.
244. Id. (citing KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 174–83 (2004); David B. Lipsky & Ariel C.
Avgar, Toward a Strategic Theory of Workplace Conflict Management, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 143, 153-54 (2008); DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR
MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR
MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 68 (2003)).
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employee base that’s not afraid to speak up when it sees something
amiss. If misconduct is immediately called out, it will stop. The
solution is an open and transparent culture. But in trying to defeat
misbehavior, companies ignore culture and mistakenly focus on
policies, processes and systems instead. These things have little
impact. Our research shows this conclusively: Only humans can
identify a social problem, and it turns out that policies have very
little influence on human behavior. We’re looking in the wrong
place for the solution to corporate misconduct. The solution is
culture.245
A culture in which complaints receive no meaningful response
encourages employees to remain silent rather than expose themselves to the
vulnerabilities of speaking up. The cycle then becomes difficult to break —
“Silence begets misconduct, misconduct begets more silence.”246 Of course,
any corporate attempts to change workplace culture and to encourage
employees to come forward will likely be stymied by a legal regime that
promotes the opposite behavior and incentivizes silence and suppression. If
courts ultimately protect retaliatory conduct, it will be far more difficult to
convince stakeholders to make real and lasting institutional change.
Employers should favor changes in retaliation doctrine to support the
forward thinking changes they are already beginning to make in their
workplaces.247 As a result, the proposals we make here that have obvious
benefits to workers also positively impact their employers and corporate
efforts to create healthier workplaces overall.
4. Proposal: Flipping the Standards
This Article proposes that courts reconsider the standards they apply to
complaining employees under the two doctrines discussed. Our proposals
are not significantly different than those suggested by other scholars. But,
in contrast to most commentators, who have considered only one or the other
of the doctrines, our analysis of the two doctrines together lends itself to a
reform proposal that highlights their relationship.
In looking at the two doctrines side by side, we focus on two aspects of
245. Dan Currell and Aaron Kotok, Preventing Bad Behavior at Your Company,
CORPORATE COUNSEL (March 17, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=12027208281
60/Preventing-Bad-Behavior-at-Your-Company [https://perma.cc/32MJ-UZEV].
246. Id.
247. Eisenberg points to Southwest Airlines and Ford as companies that have begun to
make these changes. See Eisenberg, supra note 242, at 8 (arguing that Southwest Airlines
now promotes middle managers based in part on “their ability to spark vigorous but respectful
internal debates).
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the court-created approaches: (1) the objective or subjective nature of the
standard applied or, in other words, whether the standard requires
“reasonableness” or “good faith” and (2) the actor to whom the standard is
applied — employee or employer. In the first instance, the problematic
component of the “reasonable belief” doctrine is that it applies an objective
standard to the question of an employee’s belief that the conduct he
complained about was unlawful. As described previously, courts do not ask
whether the employee honestly believed that the behavior was unlawful, nor
do they consider whether the employee held an objectively reasonable belief
that the conduct was offensive or inappropriate, necessitating a simple
common-sense judgment. Rather, the court’s only concern is whether it was
objectively reasonable to conclude that the behavior was unlawful, a
determination that requires a legal analysis to determine how a court in that
circuit would view the underlying conduct. In contrast, when faced with a
claim of insubordination, courts explicitly reject any kind of reasonableness
standard, focusing instead on the honest belief of the employer that the
employee’s conduct or manner in complaining was inappropriate. As the
Seventh Circuit in Clack made abundantly clear, “[A]rguing about the
accuracy of the employer’s assessment is [merely] a distraction because the
question is not whether the employer’s reasons for a decision are right but
whether the employer’s description of its reasons is honest.”248
Because our focus is on maximizing the productive expression of
workplace anger by employees, the solution we propose is aimed at
incentivizing anger expression by giving workers a sense of comfort in those
expressions. This, in turn, will create a healthier workplace culture in which
workers feel secure coming forward to complain about bias or any other
workplace problems. If the goal is maximizing worker comfort, the solution
should be the flipping of the two standards: employees should be held to an
honest belief standard when complaining about behavior that they believe is
unlawful discrimination whereas employers should be held to an objectively
reasonable standard when concluding that an employee’s behavior crossed
the line from productive expression into insubordination in light of the
context and workplace culture in which the expression occurred.
There are numerous reasons to reverse the standards so that employees
are held to a good faith or honest belief standard and employers to an
objective reasonableness standard. First, from a common-sense perspective,
there is a distinct imbalance in terms of access to legal information between
employees and their employers. Employers generally have far easier access

248. Clack, 304 F.App’x at 406 (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)).
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to legal counsel, whether in-house or external, than do average employees.249
As a result, when making termination decisions in insubordination cases,
employers may and often do consult with attorneys to confirm that the
planned termination does not run afoul of anti-discrimination laws and
regulations.250 Application of an objective reasonableness standard would
require employers and their attorneys to assess the decision as part of their
overall consideration of the propriety of the termination. Objective
reasonableness necessitates something more than a gut reaction, instead
requiring a consideration of the context of the employee’s conduct, the
culture of the workplace overall, and the factors that led to the employee’s
outburst. This is not a particularly onerous task to begin with but is made far
simpler by consulting with counsel who have likely seen similar occurrences
in the past and are familiar with courts’ views on reasonable behavior in this
context.251
In contrast, employees deciding whether and when to complain about
perceived discrimination rarely have access to legal advice of any kind.252
Faced with the task of determining alone whether the conduct of which they
are complaining constitutes unlawful conduct, the wise employee will
choose to keep silent rather than risk lawful termination or demotion in
retaliation for the complaint. As the dissent in Boyer-Liberto pointed out,
“An employee is not an expert in hostile work environment law.”253 Even
without legal counsel, however, employees can feel comfortable basing their
actions on their “honest” beliefs. As a result, imposing a subjective or good
faith standard on employee complaints would create an environment in
249. See Lisa Bernt, Tailoring a Consent Inquiry to Fit Individual Employment Contracts,
63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 31, 44 (2012) (holding that employers typically have legal counsel to
help them sort out the complexities of employment law, but few employees or job applicants
have meaningful access to reliable information or advice regarding the laws that govern their
livelihood).
250. Id.
251. There is precedent for applying an objective reasonableness standard in
insubordination cases. In at least two cases involving an employee who was fired for
physically striking someone in the workplace, courts have assessed the reasonableness of the
plaintiff’s conduct considering the circumstances surrounding the incident. See Folkerson v.
Circus Circus Enters., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30137, *13-14 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
when assessing retaliation and sex discrimination claims of a mime who struck a patron who
touched her and was fired, the court considered the “reasonableness” of her conduct under the
circumstances); Speed, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 361 (finding that the court assessed the conduct of a
plaintiff who struck her harasser by considering surrounding circumstances and the plaintiff’s
viewpoint).
252. Bernt, supra note 249, at 44.
253. Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 290. See also Bernt, supra note 248, at 44 (finding that
studies show that employees are systematically uninformed about their rights, lacking the
most basic knowledge about the law of the workplace).
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which employees can “feel safe and secure in bringing an incident . . . to the
attention of management.”254
Beyond the imbalance in access to legal counsel, a reversal of the
standards would also recognize the dangers in removing the employee’s
perception of discrimination from the analysis. It is well documented that
racial and gender identity can significantly impact an individual’s perception
of reasonableness or the existence of discrimination in a given situation.255
For example, Russell Robinson’s article Perceptual Segregation
convincingly argues that insiders and outsiders (or members of majority and
minority identities) “tend to perceive allegations of discrimination through
fundamentally different psychological frameworks.”256 Robinson points to
a “growing body of empirical evidence on how outsiders anticipate
discrimination, perceive that they are being discriminated against, and then
attempt to manage discrimination.”257 While courts have primarily focused
on the mental state of employers, the alleged perpetrators of discrimination,
Robinson highlights the viewpoint of victims and the dramatic differences in
how victims of discrimination understand comments or conduct as
discriminatory.258 With this in mind, the notion that an employee can be
254. Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 290.
255. See generally Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose Eyes
Are You Going to Believe? Scott V. Harris and The Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. 838 (2009) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s determination of “reasonable”
behavior in high speed chase video that conflicts with minority population’s perception of
events in video).
256. Russell Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2009).
257. Id. at 1103.
258. Id. at 1102-03. As an example, Robinson suggests the following hypothetical:
“Imagine that I conducted an experiment in which I randomly selected ten white people and
ten black people and asked them to watch a scenario involving potential discrimination. The
setting is a mostly white, fancy restaurant situated in a suburb at 8:00 pm on a Saturday. The
only all-black party is an African American family, which is seated near the back of the
restaurant. The parents try in vain several times to flag down the waiters to ask for menus and
to order food. This goes on for ten minutes. Perceptual segregation theory predicts that if we
asked our ten black and ten white people whether it is likely that race played a factor in the
restaurant staff failing to attend to the black family, the black participants would be
significantly more likely to reply that race was a factor. Specifically, the black participants
would tend to recognize, recall, and consider different information than the white participants.
For instance, the blacks might be keenly aware that the restaurant is dominated by white staff
and patrons and the black family was seated near the back, while the white participants might
say that they did not even notice race or think that the placement of the family’s table might
have correlated with race. The black participants might also take note that this is an upscale
restaurant in a wealthy suburb, where black patrons might be relatively unusual, and
potentially less welcome. By contrast, the white participants might focus on a race-neutral
explanation: the fact that the incident occurred during prime dinner hours on a weekend and
the possibility that the staff may have just been busy, rather than racially motivated.” Id. at
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judged on whether he or she possessed an “objectively reasonable” belief
that unlawful discrimination has occurred seems overly simplistic. When it
comes to assessing the existence of discrimination in particular, “reasonable
belief” is deeply connected to the identity of the believer.259
Finally, and most importantly, reversal of the standards used in these
doctrines would incentivize the type of anger expression that yields healthier
workplaces. From the perspective of an employer who wants to create a
workplace culture in which employees feel free to come forward with good
faith complaints in the hopes of addressing problems early, it clearly makes
sense to impose an “honest belief” or “good faith” standard on opposition
conduct. In other words, if an employee can demonstrate that he honestly
believed that the conduct about which he was complaining rose to the level
of unlawful discrimination, he will be assured of legal protection against
retaliation. The feeling of security that would flow from such an approach
cannot be underestimated. An employee need not know or seek out a
detailed understanding of discrimination precedents in his circuit to benefit.
He need only have a general understanding of the protections available under
law and make a sincere assessment about whether the conduct or comments
he endured violate the law.
Such increased comfort would likely also result from application of an
objective reasonableness standard to employers’ decisions to terminate
based on insubordination. In contrast to the existing “honest belief”
standard, an objective standard would require the court to seek out more than
the employer’s point of view. It would necessitate consideration of the
context of the employee’s expression, the employee’s viewpoint, and the
circumstances that gave rise to the incident. For example, several courts
have conducted such an analysis in cases in which employers claim that the
plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation because she did
not engage in protected opposition conduct, reasoning that the angry or
physical outburst was not “reasonable” opposition conduct and was thus
unprotected. This was the case in Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises,
1118.
259. See also Gorod, supra note 134, at 1495-96 (noting that “[s]tudies have shown that
there is a gender gap in the definition of sexual harassment. In general, women have a broader,
more inclusive definition of sexual harassment and are more likely than men to view mild
social sexual behavior as sexual harassment. These studies not only support the idea that
popular understandings of sexual harassment often differ from the legal definition, but they
also suggest an additional reason not to employ the “reasonable juror” standard in determining
what conduct is protected under Title VII. After all, if women tend to have a broader view of
what conduct constitutes sexual harassment, then women, one of the groups Title VII was
intended to protect, will be most likely to get caught in the gap between what members of the
public may view as reasonable and what the law does.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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in which the plaintiff, a mime hired to perform as a mechanical doll, struck
a patron (with a stuffed animal) after he came toward her with arms
outstretched and touched her shoulder.260 The employer reviewed a video
tape of the incident and terminated the plaintiff on the spot, concluding that
her behavior was inappropriate.261 The argument made by the employer was
not that the plaintiff was fired for insubordination but rather that she lacked
an actionable retaliation claim because “physical violence can never
constitute protected opposition to unlawful discrimination.”262 In other
words, the employer claimed that the plaintiff’s striking of the patron could
not constitute protected opposition conduct. In assessing the reasonableness
of the employee’s behavior on this case, the Ninth Circuit considered the
surrounding circumstances and the employee’s point of view:
Folkerson was miming a mechanical doll when a man began to
come toward her, repeatedly asking whether she was real. An
employee at a nearby rental car booth repeatedly told the man not
to touch Folkerson. The man refused to listen. Rather, he came
toward Folkerson in an aggressive manner with both arms
outstretched as though he was going to put his arms around her and
squeeze her. He succeeded in touching her shoulder. Not wanting
to break out of character, Folkerson raised her arm, in which she
held a stuffed animal, to keep the man away. In so doing, she hit
him in the mouth. The man laughed and the audience applauded.
Based on this evidence, Folkerson’s conduct appears proportionate
to the degree of threat this man posed.263
This is essentially the approach we recommend in insubordination cases
as well – consideration of the circumstances that led to the angry outburst
and an attempt to view the scenario from all relevant perspectives, not just
the employer’s. This more global approach would undoubtedly create a
greater sense of security in employees. Knowing that any expressions of
anger would be evaluated based on the “totality of circumstances” and would
not be accepted by a court as per se grounds for termination (if the employer
argued that it was insubordinate) should alleviate concerns that all anger can
be lawfully punished and lead to greater willingness on the part of employees
to speak up without fear of lawful retribution should the complaint come out
in some loud, hostile, or assertive manner.
In sum, applying a good faith standard to employees and a
reasonableness standard to employers, in addition to embodying a fairer
260.
261.
262.
263.

1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30137, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 1995).
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13-14.
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approach in keeping with the goals of Title VII, would also incentivize anger
expressions, lead to healthier workers and workplace cultures, and benefit
both workers and employers.
III.

OBSTACLES TO REFORM AND RESPONSES

A. The Courts and Workplace Culture
We anticipate that upon considering our proposal to reform retaliation
doctrine in the interest of creating healthier workplaces, a likely argument in
response will be that Title VII and the courts that enforce it have no business
considering workplace culture, employee emotional and physical health, or
any aspects of workplace management beyond elimination of discrimination.
Our response to this argument is twofold. First, as we have already alluded
to, our goal in making this proposal is not to suggest that courts will be
convinced to change retaliation doctrine on this basis. In fact, articulation of
the doctrines’ negative consequences for workplace anger expression should
not be necessary for courts to implement this change. Existing scholarship
already adequately lays out the ways in which the doctrines we discuss
impede the goals of Title VII, and those arguments alone should be sufficient
reason for courts to consider rectifying the problems.264 Our purpose instead
is to highlight for employers the negative consequences for workplace health
and productivity that also result from the existing doctrinal regime. As
employers increasingly focus on creating non-hierarchical, team-based
structures, encouraging meaningful debate as a means of promoting
innovation and worker satisfaction, and developing procedures and
mechanisms for employees to express their opinions and make complaints,
it is important to point out the ways in which the law, as it currently stands,
hinders these important developments. It is our hope that employers will
support doctrinal reform in this area because, despite the fact that reform
would benefit workers by increasing retaliation protection and encouraging
more complaints of discrimination, it would likewise benefit employers’
bottom lines.
Second, we must point out that despite workplace health being beyond
the purview of Title VII and the courts, judges are already considering these
issues when discussing retaliation doctrine. Unfortunately, in doing so,
judges often rely on their common-sense evaluation of a situation when
reference to extensive social science research would provide a better
understanding of the incentives and likely consequences of their decisions.
264. See supra Part I.C.
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For example, in Boyer-Liberto, Judge Wilkinson’s opinion, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, voices concern about any attempts to turn the
“reasonable belief” standard into a subjective rather than objective one.265
Judge Wilkinson is concerned both with undermining free speech values in
the workplace and with what he perceives will be detrimental consequences
for co-worker relationships. Without any citation to social science research,
Wilkinson opines that “[t]urning someone in as a course of first resort or on
insubstantial grounds may perpetuate resentment and bring the prospect of
employee dialogue to a premature end.”266 He further contends that a
subjective standard that protects a greater swath of employee complaints will
unnaturally hamper co-worker communication across races and sexes:
In an ideal world, the races and sexes would interact
spontaneously, in natural and creative ways. . . . Title VII must not
contribute an added element of inhibition when we communicate
with those of another sex or race. And yet I fear that is precisely
what will happen if the objectively reasonable standard is diluted
in favor of retaliation protection for any report, however marginal,
trivial, or unsubstantiated. . . . [W]here every ambiguous or
unintentionally insensitive remark is going to be reported upstairs,
employees naturally will seek to cluster with those who look, act,
and think “like themselves.” Instead of an interactive community
in which individual attributes can be recognized, understood,
celebrated, and embraced, the result will be a more fractious and
walled-off working environment where noxious stereotypes
persist. Keeping interracial distance and maintaining interracial
silence will become the safest course, the easiest way to avoid a
blot on one’s record that comes even with a co-worker’s erroneous
report.267
Again, the judge made these comments based on his own sense of
interpersonal dynamics without reference to any social science research
despite the fact that a great deal of work has been done in this area.268 The
research we discuss in this article itself demonstrates that speaking up and
reporting distressing incidents and comments whether or not they amount to
actionable discrimination actually creates a healthier more expressive culture
and not the opposite. Openly discussing troubling incidents brings workers
closer rather than silencing and isolating them further.
Similarly, in discussing free speech values in the workplace, Judge

265.
266.
267.
268.

Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 290-91.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
See supra Part II.A.
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Wilkinson makes an assumption about co-worker interactions that flies in
the face of the research on anger expression. He contends that “[w]orkplaces
in their own way are our town squares. John talking to Kathy may prove in
the end more fruitful than John running to a higher authority to have Kathy’s
point-of-view condemned.”269 But as the Geddes and Stickney research
demonstrates, John talking to Kathy about his anger rather than reporting it
is a form of suppressed or muted anger that does not solve the problem but
rather causes it to grow and spread.270 Our secondary goal in drawing
connections between retaliation doctrine and research on workplace anger is
thus to educate lawyers and the judiciary about this well-established body of
research that studies the actual impacts of the doctrines and theories
embodied in cases. When establishing court-created doctrinal standards
based on policy considerations around the real-world impact these doctrines
have, it behooves parties and courts to reference that research.
B. Widespread Increase in Litigation and Frivolous Claims
Given critiques of other proposals to expand retaliation protection, it is
likely that the other major concern about our proposal is the supposed
increase in litigation over minor workplace tussles and a rise in frivolous
complaints made in order to protect one’s job by obtaining retaliation
protection. These related concerns are based on misunderstandings of the
impact of retaliation doctrine.
First, the concern about an overall increase in litigation emerges from
the notion that employees who are protected against retaliation when
complaining about any comment or incident will thus complain far more
often and ultimately sue more often. If they feel entitled to complain about
everything, the argument goes, they will also be empowered to bring their
complaints to court. This was exactly the critique raised by the dissent in
Boyer-Liberto when the Fourth Circuit expanded its definition of a
“reasonable belief” that a hostile work environment was being created.271
The dissent warned that the new standard “will generate widespread
litigation over the many offensive workplace comments made every day that
employees find to be humiliating.”272 But, as the majority points out in that
case, litigation will only occur if employees are discharged or otherwise
punished for complaints. “Our standard is implicated solely when an

269.
270.
271.
272.

Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 292.
See supra Part II.A.
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 304.
Id.
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employee suffers retaliation for engaging in an oppositional activity.”273 In
other words, if employers heed the research we present here on anger
expression in the workplace and are focused on creating more open and
engaged workplace cultures, they will likewise be educating management
not to react punitively to complaints whether or not they rise to the level of
actionable discrimination. That education, more than anything else, will
lower the number of discrimination claims regardless of the nature of the
underlying workplace incident. As a result, providing legal protection
against retaliation simply buttresses an already wise and fiscally beneficial
approach to complaints.
Second, and relatedly, there will likely be concern that expansion to a
“good faith” standard for providing retaliation protection to employee
complaints about discrimination will result in an expansion of fake or
frivolous complaints made in order to secure job protection. The notion here
is that an employee who suspects that her job is in jeopardy for whatever
reason will be incentivized to make a complaint about alleged discrimination
in order to make it more difficult for the employer to terminate or take other
adverse actions against her since that will give rise to a retaliation claim as
well. This concern was raised by Justice Kennedy in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar in which the Supreme Court
considered whether plaintiffs should be required to meet a “but for” standard
for retaliation claims.274 The Court seemed to focus on this concern both at
oral argument and in the decision itself.275
[L]essening the causation standard could also contribute to the
filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from
efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and courts to combat
workplace harassment. Consider in this regard the case of an
employee who knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor
performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just transferred to
a different assignment or location. To forestall that lawful action,
he or she might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial,
sexual, or religious discrimination; then, when the unrelated
employment action comes, the employee could allege that it is
retaliation. If respondent were to prevail in his argument here, that
claim could be established by a lessened causation standard, all in
order to prevent the undesired change in employment
273. Id. at 287-88.
274. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). See also Sandra F. Sperino and Suja A. Thomas,
Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 223, 224 (2014) (discussing the standard for
retaliation claims).
275. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, 45-48, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
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circumstances. Even if the employer could escape judgment after
trial, the lessened causation standard would make it far more
difficult to dismiss dubious claims at the summary judgment
stage.276
However, as at least one scholar has pointed out, the Court’s concern
about employees with such ill motives was based on nothing more than pure
conjecture. Michael Zimmer took issue specifically with Justice Kennedy’s
point about frivolous lawsuits, noting that
The Court’s opinion does not cite any cases that involved facts like
the hypothetical; nor did the employer’s counsel in oral argument.
None of the briefs filed in the case cite any cases either. That is
not a surprise since the hypothetical is based on a dubious
assumption that employees who would engage in this scheming
have some rather sophisticated knowledge of employment
discrimination law.277
The concern applied to a “good faith” standard for making complaints
should face similar critique. In addition, in the context of changing the
standard to “good faith” when assessing reasonable belief that a particular
incident violated Title VII, there is some additional insurance provided by
juries evaluating such claims. The “good faith” standard suggests a sincerity
of belief that must be evaluated by the factfinder.278 This is not an uncommon
standard and is in use in multiple areas of law, relying on factfinders to
276. Nassar, 131 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
277. Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 Nev. L.J. 705, 720 (2013-14). We must note here
as well that there may be a similar critique of our proposal. We argue that average employees
do not possess sophisticated legal knowledge to make an accurate determination about
whether unlawful discrimination has actually occurred. At the same time, we contend that
the current retaliation doctrine will directly impact employee behavior and incentivize
suppression of anger. How can we reject employee’s knowledge of employment law in one
context but assume they are aware of retaliation law such that it impacts their behavior?
However, we do not assume that employees will understand retaliation doctrine from reading
cases or studying the law, but rather that they will come to understand the extremely limited
nature of retaliation protection from watching what happens to their friends and colleagues.
In contrast, it is virtually impossible to gain a clear understanding of the definition of
actionable discrimination or a hostile work environment from observing a small sampling of
cases. The inquiry is typically so fact specific that it is likely that a number of courts presented
with the same facts will themselves reach different conclusions on the question of actionable
discrimination. See Gorod, supra note 134, at 1490. Thus, employee understanding of law is
reasonable in the retaliation context but not in determining the existence of unlawful
discrimination.
278. See, e.g., Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 1113, 1116 (Cal. 2013)
(concluding that “good faith” is a subjective standard involving a “genuine and honest
belief.”).
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determine whether the holder of the “good faith belief” is being honest and
sincere in describing his or her state of mind.279 Both judges and juries are
competent at distinguishing trumped up complaints from those based on
sincere belief, essentially eliminating this imaginary problem of a rise in
frivolous complaints.280
CONCLUSION
There is no shortage of angry workers in the United States and around
the world. From reports of angry Starbucks employees who have had their
hours cut281 to angry workers in Italy’s historic Pompeii site who allegedly
tore down an ancient wall over a dispute with management282 to an
assessment by the new UK Jobs Tsar that “[a] feeling among workers that
they lack control or a voice in the workplace is fuelling ‘misery and anger in
British society,”283 reports of employees upset over working conditions, loss
of jobs to lower paid workers, and general discontent abound. Numerous
news reports have attributed both the “Brexit” vote and the election of
Donald Trump to angry working-class individuals who feel left behind by an
economy that has improved without benefiting them. 284 It is in this context
that we have sought to explore expressions of anger in the workplace and
279. Id. (involving good faith belief in the validity of a marriage). See also Hogan v. New
York Times Co., 211 F. Supp. 99, 110, (D. Conn. 1962) (involving a libel suit where court
considered “good faith belief by the defendant in the facts as published”); Bay v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11706, at *50 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 1980)
(examining defendant’s good faith belief that Plaintiffs were not as qualified as the individuals
selected because that belief would constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
decision).
280. See Gorod, supra note 133, at 1473 (good faith standard “will offer employers some
protection from retaliation suits based on frivolous complaints without compromising the
significant goals the retaliation provision can serve.”).
281. Cristina Alesci, Starbucks attempts to appease angry workers, but falls short, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 4, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/09/news/economy/donald-trumpbernie-sanders-angry-america/ [https://perma.cc/99CH-LVPH].
282. Chris Kitching, Angry Pompeii workers ‘tear down part of ancient Roman house in
clash with management, MIRROR (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/worldnews/angry-pompeii-workers-tear-down-9734826 [https://perma.cc/8HZA-S4C8].
283. Robert Booth, Workers’ feelings of powerlessness fuelling anger, says jobs tsar, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/feb/13/workersfeelings-of-powerlessness-fuelling-anger-says-jobs-tsar [https://perma.cc/MF9T-GL5N].
284. Jon Swaine, White, working-class and angry: Ohio’s left behind help Trump to
stunning win, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016
/nov/09/donald-trump-ohio-youngstown-voters [https://perma.cc/8TSB-YQWC]; Andrew
Higgins, Wigan’s Road to ‘Brexit’: Anger, Loss and Class Resentments, N.Y. TIMES (July 5,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/world/europe/wigan-england-brexit-workingclass-voters.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UCB5-PT7J.
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court-created retaliation doctrines that impact whether and how employees
feel comfortable speaking up about their discontent. While the anger
expressed by working class individuals around the world is not attributed to
discrimination but to broader societal and economic forces affecting their
jobs and future prospects, the plight and outspokenness of these workers has
brought a renewed focus on anger in the workplace that should provide an
opportunity to rethink existing laws that impact it.
That workers respond to the perception of discriminatory comments or
treatment with feelings of anger is understandable. The recent outpouring of
allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination by former employees is
a testament to the fact that these feelings do not easily abate even after an
employee has made the decision to quit.285 As a result, the important question
for employers is how to address those emotions while the employee is still
in the workplace — whether to encourage expression of anger in the form of
complaints to management or to promote suppression with employees
keeping silent or venting anger only to their co-workers and others who have
no power to respond or effect change. The psychological research
demonstrates that expression to management in any form whether it be in
calm and respectful complaints or intense, emotional outbursts is far
healthier and more productive for both the worker at issue and the workplace
overall. With this knowledge in mind, we propose a rethinking of courtcreated retaliation doctrines that discourage such displays of worker anger.
The “objectively reasonable belief” doctrine protects only those employees
who complain about conduct that courts would deem to be unlawful
discrimination while the “manner of the complaint” doctrine validates
employers who claim “insubordination” as the legitimate non-retaliatory
reason for discharge any time any employee makes a discrimination
complaint in an openly angry or emotional manner. The net impact of these
doctrines is clear — employees, upon seeing how these doctrines play out
for their co-workers will (and should) choose to keep silent in the face of
perceived discrimination. That choice, in turn, has two distinctly negative
consequences: (1) the overall goals of Title VII are hindered as fewer
employees come forward to make complaints and (2) workplace culture and
worker health and productivity suffer as angry emotions are bottled up.
While scholars and workers’ advocates have for years highlighted the
former, our aim in this article is to illuminate the latter consequence and to
propose changes that benefit both workers and their employers. While it is
rare that a proposal to expand workers’ rights and protections also benefits
employer interests, that is decidedly the case here. It is time for courts to
285. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
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take note of the real-world social consequences of their doctrines and to
make changes for the benefit of all.

